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How do strategies actually form in an organization? And what 
effects do growth, formalization and diversification have on the 
evolution of strategy making in an entrepreneurial corporation? 
Examination of these questions within one organization using a 
methodology developed by Mintzberg (1979a) is the purpose of this 
study. 
Strategy Format ion in an Organization 
To a large extent, research on strategy formation has relied 
on rationalized models of decision making. For example Chandler 
(1962:13) defines strategy as "the determination of the basic long-
term goals and objectives of the enterprise, and the adoption of 
courses of action and allocation of resources necessary for carrying 
out these goals." Here strategy is a plan, a set of guidelines for 
actions that will be carried out in some sequential order extending 
into the future. Strategy is also defined as positioning, how and 
where the organization locates itself in its environment, or as a 
precept ion ( a concept or "Weltanschaung"). 
Most of these "rational model" definitions focus on strategy 
formation as intention with little consideration of the actions and 
behavior of strategists. 
An alternative definition has been advanced by Mintzberg (1972, 
1978; Mintzberg and Waters, 1982, 1983b) where strategy is a pattern 
in the stream of organizational decisions and actions. Here the 
model is conceptualized as a process, and strategy becomes the con-
sistency of the decision making behavior in the organizations. The 
focus of the model is consistency of behavior over time. Emphasis is 
not on the intentions but rather on realization (accomplishment) of 
strategy . What actually happens within the organization is what 
matters; i.e., How do they end up in certain positions?; How did they 
get there?; and How do they go about changing or maintaining t heir 
position?. 
Thus, the Mintzberg model broadens the conception of strategy 
beyond that of strategies which are intended and realized (deliberate) 
to include strategies which though intended are never realized 
(unrealized strategies) to strategies which were never intended but 
which were realized anyway (emergent strategies). These relation-
ships are shown schematically in Figure 1. Further, in this model 
strategy occurs within a context: the environment, and the organi-
zation's structure and leadership. At issue is the deliberateness 
of the strategy, and the interplay of environment, leadership and 
organization within the pattern of strategic change over time 
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1982 :1): 
Today's strategies ---and tomorrow's---no matter how 
much they seek to alter direction, are very much rooted 
in yesterday's. 
Given this conception, the study of strategy making becomes 
(1) the search for consistencies in action and (the decision making) 
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Fi gure 1. Relationship between Intended and Realized Strategi es . 
and (3) the analysis of the relationships between intended and 
unintended strategies. 
Such a process definition and model leads to a study approach 
that is both descriptive and inferenti al. The method developed by 
Mintzberg for studying strategy formation requires that time be 
spent in the subject organization looking for traces of its 
strategy over long periods of time. This procedure can be divided 
into four broad stages: 
l. Tracking decision streams over long periods of time 
(isolate decision/action streams in various critical 
areas), 
2. Infer strategies (as the consistencies in such streams), 
3. Infer major periods of strategy development, and 
4. Investigate the forces appearing in each period 
(leadership, organization and environment and their 
role in major shifts from one period to another) and 
associate the findings with key theoretical propositions 
on strategy formation. 
This method of study has been applied by Mintzberg and his 




Canadelle (women 1 s undergarment manufacturing) 
Sherbrooke Record (newspaper) 
Arcop (architecture) 
National Film Board of Canada 
Air Canada 
Saturday Night Magazine 
Asbestos Corporation 
McGill University 











The research, begun as a project in 1971, is called 11 Patterns in 
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Strategy Formation." Many of these studies of strategy formation have 
been reported in the literature since 1978. Two of particular re l evance 
to this report are the Steinberg Study (1982) and Canadian Lady Study 
(1983a). Both are studies of strategy formation in entrepreneurial 
firms. 
General Cinema - An Entrepreneurial Organization 
For this research the Mintzberg approach to tracking strategy 
was applied to the study of strategy formation in General Cinema 
Corporation between 1960-1983. General Cinema, an entrepreneurial, 
high growth company, is the outgrowth of a company founded by Mr. 
Phi l ip Smith in 1922. The Company, organized to build and operate 
movie theaters, has had a history of innovation in the theater 
exhibition industry. In 1935 Mr. Smith constructed and opened the 
first drive-in theater in the United States. The Company became one 
of the three largest drive-in exhibitors in the United States. Mr. 
Smith is also credited with opening the first shopping mall theater 
in 1951 . . 
In 1960 two companies, Smith Theater Company and Midwest Drive-In, 
were combined to form General Drive-In Corporation. 1 Mr. Smith's 
son, Richard Smith, was instrumental in this decision to form a 
public corporation (Uyterhoeven, 1976:3): 
In the late 1950 1 s, Richard Smith, who had assumed respon-
sibility for developing new theater locations, noticed that 
the number of shopping centers under consideration was 
increasing rapidly. However, he found promoters, whom 
he asked t o invest the $300,000 required for a 1, 200 seat 
1Pr i or to the publ ic offering, the Smith family owned or con-
trolled 45.3% and the Stoneman family 25.4% of the outstanding stock 
of the combined companies. These amounts were reduced to 34.9% and 
20.0% f oll owing the of f ering. In 1976 these percent ages were approx-
imately 25.1 % and 12 .4%, the reduction due largely t o a secondary 
issue in 1968. 
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theater, reluctant to take the risk in a troubled industry 
in conjunction with a small private company. The 1960 
merger and public offering were conceived to ease the 
financial impediments to growth. 
The corporation began operation with 49 theaters (26 drive-ins). 
During the ensuing years the Company, renamed General Cinema Corp-
oration in 1964, became the largest theater chain in the United 
States, as well as, by 1976, the largest independent bottler of both 
Pepsi-Cola and Dr. Pepper, and the largest United States soft-drink 
bottling company. 
Today, General Cinema operates 1034 theaters at over 300 loca-
6 
tions in 39 states and the District of Columbia. General Cinema remains 
the largest theater exhibitor in the United States and the worl d. The 
basic character of the Company appears in the introductory remarks 
of Mr. Richard Smith in the 1983 Annual Report: 
Since General Cinema became a public company 23 years 
ago, management's primary objective has been the creation of 
value. We have sought to accomplish this objective by 
managing General Cinema as a growth company, believing 
that we could creat e lasting value for our share-holders 
from a growing base of productive assets, enhanced earning 
power and a consistent and increasing positive cash flow. 
Management remains ·committed to this basic philosophy. 
The results shown in the Financial Highlights inside this 
overleaf demonstrate General Cinema's ability to create 
lasting value by consistently providing our shareholders 
with a total return---appreciation in the market value 
of General Cinema shares plus cash dividends---commen-
surate with that of a leading growth company. 
A summary of the Company's performance for the past ten years is shown 
in Table I. 
The 1983 Fortune 500 ranks General Cinema 317th in size, 65th 
in total return to investors and 83rd in ten-year earnings per share 
growt h. Forbes' 36th annual "Survey of American Industry" ranked 
TABLE I 
GENERAL CINEMA 10 YEAR AVERAGE ANNUAL 




Earnings from continuing operations 
excluding nonrecurr ing items 
Net earnings from continuing operations 
excluding nonrecurring items: 
Cash flow from continuing operations 
exclud ing nonrecurri ng items 
Cash dividends paid 
Total assets 
Shareholders' equity 
Earnings from continuing operations 
excluding nonrecurring items 
Net earnings from continuing operations 
excluding nonrecurring items: 
Cash flow from continuing operations 
excluding nonrecurring items 
Common dividends paid 
Book value 
Source: 1983 Annual Report 
10-Year Average 














General Cinema 39th in profitability for 1,008 companies judged on 
a five-year average return on equity. 
As General Cinema's goal in the past has been growth, so it 
remains: (Annual Report, 1983) 
Management's continuing objective is to increase earnings 
per share at an average annual rate 5-10% in excess of 
inflation. While General Cinema ' s businesses are able 
to support that growth in the short run, we are committed 
to investing in our long-term future. Toward that end, 
the responsibility for achieving the long-term growth 
and diversification goals of the Company has been con-
centrated within the Office of the Chairman. Our search 
for acquisitions is focused on consumer products and 
services industries. Our criteria are strict and our 
intention is to create value for General Cinema's share-
holders, not to 'conglomerate' the company. Sound 
corporate growth and development are among our highest 
priorities, and although we would prefer to acquire an 
entire business, we would consider a major investment in 
another company . 
The strategies of General Cinema's growth and diversification 
from 1960-1983, particularly the patterns of actions employed f or 




Different Approaches to Studying Strategy 
The l iterature on the study of strategy may be broadly grouped 
as conceptual or empirical. In the conceptual liter ature three broad 
categories or approaches to the making of strategy are descri bed: 
entrepreneurial, adaptive and planning. The characteristics of 
each mode of strategy formation are found in Table I I (Mintzberg, 
1973:49). A variety of typologies are to be found in t he emp i rical 
literature. One such typology, proposed by Mintzberg (1979), uses five 
"configurations" of structure and situation, labeled as Simple 
Structure, Machine Bureaucracy, Divisionalized Form, Professional 
Bureaucracy, and Adhocracy. Mintzberg (1983d) associates the entre-
preneurial mode with the Simple Structure, the planning mode with the 
Machine Bureaucracy and the adaptive mode with Adhocracy. 
Much of the conceptual literature conceives strategy from a 
planning mode which focuses on the intentions of leaders---what they 
plan to do in the futu re. An alternate way of proceedi ng is to ex-
amine what the organizat i on did compared with what they said they 
woul d do. This difference becomes the basis for the distincti on 
between realized and intended strategi es, as well as the basis for 
differing approaches to the study of strategy formation. Attention 
to the realization of strategy l eads the researcher to pay more 
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TABLE II 
CHARACTERISTICS AND CONDITI ONS OF THE 
THREE MODES OF STRATEGY MAKING 
Characteristic Entrepre-
neurial Mode 
Motive for Decisions Proactive 
Goals of Organi- Growth 
zation 
Evaluation of Judgemental 
Proposals 
Choices made by Entrepreneur 
Decision Horizon Long Term 
Preferred Environ- Uncertainty 
ment 
Decision Linkages Loosely 
Coupled 
Flexibility of Mode Flexible 
Size of Moves Bold 
Decisions 
Vision of Direction General 
Condition for Use 






















































attention to behaviors and actions , to what leaders actually do, not 
to what they say. For Mintzberg this shift in focus led to "studying 
strategi es as patterns in streams of actions, not decisions." 
(Decisions precede action, and as such may or may not represent a 
commitment to action; therefore they are often harder to trace and 
may be more or less associated with the "realized" strategy.) The 
focus is on pattern recognition, on isolating "streams of behavior" 
and then identifying the consistencies in such streams as strategy. 
In such a context, emergent strategies, those not based on intent i on, 
become important to the overall conception of strategy formation. 
(Refer again to Figure l .) 
Mintzberg argues that for a strategy to be purely deliberate in 
an organization, three conditions would be necessary: 
l. Precise intention must have clearly existed. 
2. Within the organization, the intentions must be commonly 
articulated by all the members. 
3. The "collective" intention(s) must have been realized 
as intended. 
Entrepreneurial, planned and ideological strategi es are most 
closely associated with deliberate strategy formation. Emergent 
strategies, formed out of process---the dynamic interaction of 
leadership, organization (structure) and environment---are less 
associated with intention and deliberateness. 
The two ends of the deliberate strategy continuum are planned 
and entrepreneurial strategies. Planned strategies require hi gh 
communication where intentions are clearly articulated and dispersed 
throughout the organization. The environment is acquiescent and 
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predictable. Formation and implementation of strategy are separate 
and distinct. 
Mintzberg and Waters (1982) argue that planning is not so much 
strategy as it is programming. Strategies are not conceived in 
planning processes but have their origins elsewhere, in "visions" 
or "borrowings" of the strategist. 
The other end of the continuum of deliberate strategy, the 
entrepreneurial, is usually individual and "visionary." Entre-
preneurial strategies require control of the organization's actions. 
12 
Strategy need not be articulated or elaborated. There is less require-
ment of overt acceptance of the strategy by the organization. Here the 
formulator is the chief implementor. And as the entrepreneur st rate-
gists implement, they also learn as they are "exposed to feedback on 
past actions or perceive new opportunities or threats in the environ-
ment." Strategy can be reformulated (adapted), becoming a variant 
of emerging strategy (Mintzberg and Waters, 1983b:9): 
It is this adaptability that distinguished the entrepreneuri al 
strategy from the planned one---the notion that a single 
actor can easily respond to the environment. Visions con-
tained in individual brains appear to be more flexible 
than plans articulated through hierarchies. At least 
this should be true so l ong as the individual actor 
is able and willing to learn. In the case of planned 
strategy, adaptation [and emergentness] are di scouraged 
by the articulation of the intentions and by the separation 
between formulation and implementation. Instead of one 
individual being able to change his or her mind, a whole 
system of commitments and procedures, in the form of plans, 
programs and controls elaborated down a hierarchy, must 
be redesigned. Thus, despite proposals for flexible 
planning, the fact is that organizations plan not to be 
flexible but to realize specific intentions. It is the 
entrepreneurial strategy that provides flexibility, at 
the expense of the specificity and articulation of inten-
tions. Thus, in this latter case the force for 
deliberateness---the central actor's vision---can also be 
one for emergentness. 
Entrepreneurial strategies tend to evolve toward planned strategy 
as the organization grows successful and becomes more compl ex, or 
when the leadership shifts emphasis from visions/solutions to problems 
to opportunities. Emergent strategies now derive primarily from 
process and umbrella strategies. The use of t hese emergent 
strategies offers the organization greater flexibility and ability 
to continue to adapt as it shifts toward greater internal coordination 
of its actions. It is a way of building learning into the formation 
of strategy in a more complex environment, which also requires more 
"planning." The major features of these various strategies are 
presented in Table III (Mintzberg and Waters, 1983b:28). 
Strategy Formation in the Entrepreneurial Mode 
The view in the conceptual literature of the entrepreneurial 
13 
mode is "power centralized in the hands of the chief executive, whose 
behavior is dominated by the active search for opportunities, by the 
pursuit of the goal of growth above all, and by the taking of dramatic 
leaps forward in the face of uncertainty" (Mintzberg and Waters, 1983c). 
The view presented in the empirical studies (Mintzberg and Waters, 
1982, 1983a) shows the entrepreneurial organization as having a 
simple and fluid structure, with relatively little hierarchy or formal-
ization of behavior, and minimal reliance on "technical" staff. And 
above all power resides with the chief executive officer, who exer-
cises this power in a personal, entrepreneurial way. The predominant 
behavior is "controlled boldness" (solving problems rather than 
searching for opportunities). 
14 
TABLE III 









precise intentions formulated and articulated by 
central l~adership, backed up by formal controls 
to ensure surprise-free implementation in benign, 
controllable, or predictable environment; strate-
gies most deliberate (often mainline strategies, 
sometimes overrealized) 
intentions exist as personal, unarticulated vision 
of single leader, and so adaptable to new oppor-
tunities; organization under personal control 
of leader and located in protected niche in 
environment; strat egies relatively deliberate but 
can emerge (can be digressive, serendipitous, 
inadvertent, opportun1st1c, or subconscious 
strategy) 
leadership in partial control of organizational 
actions, defines strategic targets or boundaries 
within which other actors respond to own f orces 
or to complex, unpredictable environment; 
strategies partly deliberate, partly emergent, 
and deliberately emergent (also target strategy) 
leadership controls process aspects of strategy 
(hiring, structure, etc.), leaving content 
aspects to other actors; strategies partly 
deliberate, partly emergent (and, again, deli-
berately emergent) 
Source: Mintzberg and Waters (1983b:28) 
The entrepreneur is not a formal, detailed pl anner, but rather 
he has a concept, a personal vision of the business. What shapes 
his actions is his intimate, detail ed personal knowledge of the 
business. Key to major strategy shifts is the flexibility of this 
vision to elaborate and rework the conception as necessary for 
continued growth and success. Frequent ly the actual change in mind-
set is triggered by only a few major events, with one critical 
incident causing disparate data to form a synthesis for a new 
strategy (Mintzberg and Waters, 1983c; 1983b:l0) : 
Here, typically, brief periods of conception of new 
strategies, when strong visions emerged as the leaders 
comprehended changed environments, were foll owed by 
long periods of deliberate pursuit of these visions. 
The talent of the entrepreneurial mind is the ability to pursue 
a vision for many years and then shift when needed. 
How does the execut i ve mind funct i on when such a shift becomes 
necessary? The Steinberg (Mintzberg and Waters, 1982) and Canadian 
Lady (Mintzberg and Waters, 1983a) entrepreneurial studies found that 
the key to generating strategic vision, and to changing that strategy 
at the right time, "is intimate detailed knowledge of the business" 
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1983c). This derives from the ability to 
spot changes occurring in the environment and to understand how they 
will impact the industry. Lewin (1951 ) suggests that the mind 
"unfreezes," recognizes that in fact the environment has changed and 
opens itself to what is happening. The mind must now change, using 
solutions and opportunities to create a new concept of the business---
and a new strategic t hrust. Once the mind has acquired a new vis ion, 
a "mi nd set " becomes established, total ly focused on the new str ategic 
15 
thrust (Mintzberg and Waters, 1983c:9): 
The conception of a novel strategy is an exercise in 
synthesis, which is typically best carried out in a 
single, informed brain. That is why the entrepreneurial 
mode is at the center of the most glor i ous corporate 
successes. 
From the study of the entrepreneurial firm of Steinberg 
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1982) several important observations were 
made about strategy formation in the entrepreneurial firm: 
l. There was the presence of waves or cycles in the company's 
development. 
2. From the simple structure configuration of the company's 
early years, there was gradual movement of elaboration 
and standardization of structure towards a more formal-
i zed configuration in later years. 
3. The growth progressed unevenly. 
4. Changes in strategy occurred infrequent ly. 
Perhaps most important is the observat i on that as the company 
ages and grows in size (reaps the benefits of entrepreneurship) the 
entrepreneurial mode began to be captured by the pl anning mode. 
Str ategy, Structure, Environment and Leadership 
Several studies in the l i terature examine the rel ationship between 
16 
strategy and organizational characteristics, environment and leadership. 
In the entrepreneurial organization structure clearly follows strategy, 
particularly in the early stages of the organization's development. 
But as the organization grows in si ze, Mintzberg and Waters (}982:497) 
argue that ''eventually strategy, to some extent at least, has to fol l ow 
str ucture , as we 11 as environment." 
Other studi es l end support t o this argument. For exampl e , Grinyer 
and Yasai-Ardekani (1980, 1981: with Al-Bazzaz, 1980) examined various 
dimensions of organizational structure and concluded (1981:479): 
Size is obviously the dominant , possibly intervening 
variable with respect to both diversification and macro-
organizational characteristics. 
Structure is linked with strategy (and diversification) through 
size. Grinyer and Yasai-Ardekani al so associated complex structural 
factors with bureaucracy through the use of formalism and specialized 
personnel "as a means of controlling decentralized decision making 
authority" (1980:418). Consistent with the research study of Marsh 
and Mannari (1 981), they found that decentralization is at the opera-
tional level while strategy is still centralized at the level of top 
management. Thus increases in complexity and size lead to increased 
structure (bureaucracy) as a means of coordination, adaptation and 
contra l ( see Figure 2). 
In another examination of the relationship between size, com-
plexity and structure (administrative intensity) in 91 organizations 
between 1965 and 1975, Denton (1982:68) found a simple linear 
17 
relationship "with size leading to complexity leading to administrative 
intensity." 
A study by Mileti, Gillespie and Eitzen (1979) found that: 
1. Size is directly associated with horizontal differentiation: 
growth, more complexity, and more need for labor 
specialization; 
2. Geographical dispersion is associated with vertical 
differentiation; and 
3. Decentr alized decision making has a positive, linear 
relationship with geographical differentiation. 
Mileti et al. (1979:738) also found that authority is not given 
up by top management as this differentiation occurs. Rather top 
















Figure 2. Relationship between Strategy, Environment, Leadership 
and Structure 
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greater reliance for information on those who have the informat ion from 
that particular geographical area and its operations. 
Thus structural change may follow strategy (Miller, 1982:131) or 
structure (bureaucracy) may resist or retard needed strategic change. 
Recent literature studies argue that change may be piecemeal or 
incremental (a few elements change at the same time) or quantum 
(Miller and Friesen, 1982:890): 
Successful firms are more likely than unsuccessful firms to 
evidence both extreme changes and no changes in structure . 
... it may be useful for structural variables to increase 
or decrease dramatically and quick ly. Inc remental structural 
change was less likely to be undertaken by high performing 
firms . 
Miller and Friesen (1982:871) argue that change in structure may 
introduce distortions and may increase the uncertainty and hetero-
geneity in the environment, thereby requ i ring "simultaneous adoption " 
of a number of devices for uncertainty reduction, differentiation, 
and integration. Because of the strong effect new innovation has on 
structure, size and complexity, changes which result from the inno-
vation may require harmonious changes in structure and strategy 
(internal and external environmental relations). Change in the 
external environment, especially from innovation, may cause the 
organization to adopt a new strategy which, in turn, requires 
change in the internal environment (structure). Likewise, the organi-
zation may adopt new technology (or acquire such firms) which requ i res 
a change in structure. Grinyer and Yasai-Ardekani (1981 :483 ) recog-
nize the association of strategy with structure and observe that 
"both are attended by gr eater use of bureaucracy as a 'strategy of 
control' [Child, 1972], with age, status, size of parent company and 
complexity of production and design and development tec hnologies." 
The picture that emerges, then, is that of companies diversi-
fying as they grow older, and in the process becoming more 
"technologically" advanced, but above all larger {Grinyer and Yasai-
Ardekani, 1981 :483). Figure 3 summarizes the significant relation-
ships between size, structure and diversification. 
Some General Conclusions About Strategy Formation 
Three essential themes arise from the Mintzberg et al. research. 
They are: 
l. Strategy formation may be viewed as the dynamic interact i on 
of environment and bureaucratic momentum, with leadership 
mediating between the two. 
2. There appear to be distinct regularities to strategy 
formation over time. 
3. The interplay between intended and emergent strategies 
relative to realized strategy may be at the heart of the 
strategy formation process. 
With regard to the first theme, a partial explanation is that the role 
of leadership becomes more complex as the organization grows and 
diversifies. The entrepreneur in the early stages of the organi-
zation's history is most oriented toward the environment and the 
changes occurring in the external environment. His role is problem 
solving and visionary guide for innovation. As the bureaucracy grows 
(and seeks stability), and the structure of the organization becomes 
more complex {through diversification and later divisionalization), 
the entrepreneur must be more oriented toward mediating between 
maintaining the stability of the company's operating system and with 
the organization's adapting to environmental change. The entrepreneur 
assumes more responsibility for boundary spanning between the organi-
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Figure 3. Significant Relationships Between Organization 
Variables 
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a gradual sh i ft occurs from strategy defining structure to structure 
resisting or reshaping strategy (Mintzberg, 1978:941): 
Strategy can then be viewed as the set of consistent 
behaviors by which the organization establishes for a 
time its place in its environment, and strategic 
change can be viewed as the organization's response 
to environmen tal change, constrained by the momentum 
of the bureaucracy and accelerated or dampened by the 
leadership. 
As an organization becomes successful, the very success of its 
strategy leads the organization (members) to cling to it, and this 
commitment to a successfu l strategy may begin to act as a barrier 
to strategic change. Operating systems and structure shape the 
organization's view of strategy---often bringing it i nto conflict 
with the entrepreneurial mode. Here the skill of t he entrepreneur 
to lead the organization to new strategy requires more complex 
management and mediation skills to guide bureaucratic momentum in 
new directions. 
Regarding the second theme, the pattern of strategy change 
usually is in response to changes in the environment, either gradua l 
or suddenly turbulent. Here Mintzberg's study results suggest two 
main patterns: 
l. There is a long term life cycle to an overall strategy-- -
its conception, elaboration, decay and death. 
2. There is the presence of periodic (shorter-term) waves 
of change and continu i ty within the life cyc l e. 
This latter pattern suggests that change, even incremental, has 
its bursts of activity followed by continuity. In the early stages 
of the organization's history, there is l ess bureaucratic momentum 
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so change appears to come about more quickly. However, i n lat er stages 
of a strategy (successful) "life cycle, " the ability to change a 
strategy may require a non-incremental approach. Why might this be 
so? 
... strategic decision processes in organizations are not 
continuous, but irregular. They must be specifically 
evoked; they proceed for a time; and then they terminate. 
Furthermore ... the leadership of an organization may 
choose to deal with conflicting pressures for change 
from the environment and continuity from the bureaucracy 
by first acceding to one and then the other (Mintzberg, 
1978:943). 
Organizations early in their history frequently adopt a "gestalt" 
strategy, one that is unique and well integrated, which enables the 
organization to niche. They are usually the product of a single, 
visionary mind, who effects strong leadership. Frequently the 
strategy (niche) serves to protect the organization from competitors 
for a period of time . However, if competitors move into the niche, 
or the market moves away from it, the integration of the strategy may 
prevent the organization from making the necessary major changes in 
strategy. This becomes the strategy-makers dilemma--- "the danger of 
incremental change versus the difficulty of global change" (Mintzberg, 
1978:945). 
In the third theme, central to the interplay between intended 
and realized strategy is the formulation (and formulator) of strategy. 
The most successful deliberate strategies appear to be formulated by 
leaders who know their industry intimately---"and who are able to 
predict conditions in environments that were settling down after 
periods of great turbul ence" (Mintzberg , 1978:946). Thus once an 
emergent strategy becomes perceived, it becomes a deliberate strategy. 
And as this strategy becomes the new intended strategy, thereby 
"formalized" by the bureaucracy, the strategy is taken over by the 
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operating system for implementation. In effect the strategy now has 
a "l if e of its own . " 
Based on the Mintzberg studies, several conclusions about strategy 
formation are suggested: 
l. Strategy conception interacts with strategy implementation 
through learning and feedback. The relationship is dynamic. 
2. Strategy is not fixed as is a plan, nor does it change at a 
pre-established time. 
3. Strategy has a life of its own and is not just subject to 
the will of management. 
4. Patterns in organizational decisions may not always be 
conscious. 
5. Structure may not always follow strategy, but it may lead 
or shape the perception of viable options. 
6. Contingency planning may lead to the organization explicating 
and adopting (fixing on) inappropriate strategy, especially 
when the environment is "turbulent." 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
The procedure used to examine strategy formation in General 
Cinema Corporation and its Theater Division between 1960 and 1983 
is from Mintzberg. The methodology is generally described in t he 
1 i terature ( Mi ntzberg and Waters, 1982, 1983a) and in a mimeographed 
guide (Mintzberg and Waters, 1979) entitled "Steps in Research on 
Strategy Formation." 
The selected organization is exami ned through a four-step pro-
cedure. The organization is studied intensively over the decades of 
its existence for its patterns of strategic change, the interplay 
between the entrepreneur, the environment and the organization, and 
t he role in the strategy formation process of deliberate and emergent 
strategies. The nature of this methodology requires that time be 
spent in the organization to gather the various types of information 
required to track strategy across the l ong periods of time involved. 
The four steps of the research method are: 
Step 1. Gather the Basic Data (Strategy Traces). The first step 
is the collection of basic data. Historical data is obtained to pro-
vide a chronology of the decisions and actions of the organization, 
along with related trends and events in the environment, and all 
available figures on the organization's performance. Activities 
during this stage include: 
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, Gain an overview of the organization and its industry. 
, Make an initial identification of major strategy areas 
to guide the search for data. 
, Gather available data to chronicle decisions, trends and 
results. (It is important to identify all available 
reports, documents, studies and outside information sources.) 
, Conduct initial interviews with those who have extensive 
knowledge on the history of the organization. 
, Establish a chronology of the decisions and actions with 
environmental trends and results. Graphically display this 
information. 
Step 2. Infer the Patterns and Periods. The organization's 
strategies are inferred from the chronology with related graphs 
produced at the end of Step l. Each strategy is labeled and 
represented on a time scale. These representations are then 
integrated on a common scale for the period examined , and the major 
periods in the history of the organization are inferred. The result 
is a presentation of the major strategies and their overall relation-
ships during the periods of study. 
Step 3. Analysis of Each Major Period. Here the focus shifts 
from period transitions to internal organization dynamics, to who were 
the people and the forces which shaped the strategy for each period. 
The strategy for the period, the forces that shaped it, the underlying 
causes of change in strategy, and the nature of the interrelationships 
among the different strategies are intensively examined. Background 
information on the environment, internal documents and interviews 
are central to this stage of the analysis. 
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This stage results in a descriptive report, covering each distinct 
period of the study. Major decisions, actions, and strategies are 
discussed along wi th t he events, trends, forces that influenced t he 
observed results, along with an overall exploration of how and why 
all this happened. Some theoretical interpretation is made of the 
strategies and the strategy formation process for the various 
periods. 
Step 4. Theory Building. A brain storming approach by the 
researcher(s) initiates this step. The organization's history, and 
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the explanations of its patterns and periods, are used to extract and 
induce whatever theoretical conclusions may be drawn from this investi-
gation. Of interest are (1) the patterns of change in the strategies 
with the interplay of the changing environment, leadership and 
bureaucratic momentum, (2) the relationship between strategy and 
structure and (3) the role of deliberateness and proactivity in the 
strategy change process. 
This paper presents the results of the application of the 
Mintzberg research methodology on strategy formation for General 
Cinema Corporation from 1960 through 1983. The purpose of this paper 
is to demonstrate how the wide array of strategies used in an organi-
zation over time can be described and analyzed. Data for this study 
had to rely primarily on annual reports since 1960 and other des-
criptive documents which summarized the history and decisions made 
in the early years of the organization. Two site visits were made to 
corporate headquarters in Boston. Additional conversations were con-




General Cinema history from its inception as a public corporation 
in 1960 was tracked. A variety of distinct strategy areas were in-
ferred. Some strategies were from actual plots of specific decisions 
and actions, as in the case of theater openings. Others were inferred 
from the chronological listing of General Cinema events and responses 
to environmental trends. The results which follow were derived using 
the previously described methodology. These steps are summarized 
in Figure 4. 
Strategies of General Cinema Corporation 1960-1983 
The chronological listing of General Cinema events, environmental 
trends and responses is presented in Table 4. From this, and other 
documents, many major strategies were identified, along with the 
company's performance and structure. A series of graphs were then 
developed to symbolically represent this information. (Note that the 
horizontal dimension of the strategy graphs represent the time periods 
of the various activities while the vertical dimension has symbolic/ 
relative meaning only.) 
General Cinema Growth and Performance 
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A historical review of General Cinema's financial performance is 
provided by Tables 5-8. In 1960 the Company had $6.7 million in equity. 
I. COLLECTION OF BASIC DATA 
• Develop historical chronology of 
organizational decisions and 
actions and important environ-
mental trends 
• Record results in graphical 
form 
II. I NFER STRATEGIES 
• Identify patterns and periods 
• Represent symbolically on a time 
scale 
• Compare strategy by common scale 
• Infer major periods in organi-
zation ' s history 
III. INVESTIGATE MAJOR PERIOD TRANSITIONS 
• Focus on underlying causes of major 
strategy changes 
• Probe softer data and reports for 
additional information 
• Interview key actors where 
available 
IV. BUILD THEORY 
• Focus on major conceptual issues 
• Examine relationship--goals, strategy, 
environment, leadership and structure 
Figure 4. Steps in Strategy Research 
29 
TABLE IV 
CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF GENERAL CINEMA ACTIVITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS 
AND RESPONSES/ACTIONS OF THE COMPANY 
Chronological Listing of 
GCC Events 
1922 - Smith Theater Company 
established 
1935 - Smith (Philip) Company 
constructed and opened 





Growth in public attending motion 
pictures 
Growth of open-air segment of the 
exhibition industry began prior to 
~Jor l d War II 
World War II - gas rationing and 
Daylight Savings Time 
Government intervention in the 
industry 
, Led to breaking up of the "Big 
Five" large movie chains' domi-
nation (Paramount, Twentieth 
Century Fox, Warner Brot hers, 
Loew's and RKO) 
• End in vertical integration 
in the industry - now divided 




Company organized to build 
and operate movie theaters. 
Also involved in the manage-
ment of theaters through Smith 
Management Company. 
Became one of the most 
successful entrants into the 
open-air segment of the 
industry. 
Company barely survived the 
World War II period. 
Expanded indoor theaters in 





Growth in outdoor theaters 
1951 - Smith Theater Company 
built the first shopping 
center theater in the 
country - Frammingham 
Shopper's World 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Television was competing for 
indoor audience theaters. Drive-
in t heaters were expanding 
rapidly, attracting family and 
young people. (Between 1949 and 
1960, drive-ins grew from 2% to 
30% of theater industry.) Growth 
in family-oriented films. 
Populations were shifting/ 
growing in the suburbs. This 
populati.on had more leisure time 
and interest in family recreation. 
Several trends were evolving: 
• new shopping habits 
• activities were accessible 
by nearby developing highway 
network 
• convenience - in parking/ 
other 
• r i sing standard of l iving/ 
more "spendable" income 
Growth of alternative leisure 
activities led to greater compet-
ition and further decline of 
downtown exhibitors and major 
film production companies. 
Overall decline in the indoor 
theater revenues, feature films 
and number of theaters. Continued 
growth in number of drive-in 
theaters. 
Mid-West Drive- In Theaters 
became one of the largest 
competitors in this segment. 
Company increased revenues by 
lengthening the playing 
season (introduced car 
heaters) and by building 
modern concession facilities 
and playground areas. 
Expanded drive-ins and began 
to move into shopping center 
theater development. 
Continued to introduce modern 
conveniences at drive-ins 
(individual car speakers and 
modern concession facilities). 
w 
1960 - Midwest Drive-In acquired 
Smith Theater Company and 
the combined companies 
went public as General 
Drive-In Corporation 
1961 - Expansion of theaters into 
shopping centers and con-
struction/operation of 
ten-pin bowling centers. 
1962 - Company defined its 
business as Leisure Time 
Enterta inment with goal 
of balanced, diversified 
growth. 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Growth in drive-ins leveled off 
in late l950's as land avail-
ability declined and land values 
escalated rapidly. Theater 
expansion shifted to shopping 
malls. 
Rising interest in alternative 
leisure time recreation. Year 
had poor motion picture 
attractions. 
Capital funding became easily 
available for shopping center 
development. Major insurance 
companies were willing to finance 
loans for theaters. 
Rise of twin theaters providing 
great variety of available films 
at one location with staggered 
times. 
Company established to create 
access to capital markets. 
Used proceeds for expansion 
of shopping center theaters 
and diversification into 
ten-pin bowling. Position 
company to capitalize on 
suburban population growth and 
leisure time trends. 
Expansion continued into 
ten-pin bowling. Goal was a 
balanced year around cash 
flow from drive-ins (summer) 
and bowling (winter). Company 
saw business as leisure time 
recreation, family oriented. 
Company borrowed $4,000,000 
in longterm debt. 
Company concentrated theater 
growth in ma j or regional 
shopping centers. 
Drive in expansion shifted 
from new construction to 
growth by acquisition of 




1963 - Changed name of company to 
General Cinema Corporation. 
Began building Cinema I 
and II theaters (two 
auditoriums, 500 and 
1000-seat theaters under 
one roof). Bowling 
expansion complete. 
Operating at a modest loss. 
1964 - Sold resort theaters 
(unprofitable). List stock 
on American Stock Exchange. 
Bowling operation has loss 
for second year. 
1965 - 5-4 split of shares. 
Continued revenue growth 
in mall and drive-in 
theaters and vending/ 
concession, and losses 
in bowling. 
1966 - Acquired ten drive-ins 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Box office receipts reach a 
fourteen-year high for the 
industry. Showing more first 
run films simultaneously. 
Change in audience profile 
to younger, better educated 
and more affluent. 
Increased competitive ability 
of mall theaters/shift of first 
run films to suburban theaters. 
Overall industry growth and 
prosperity balance shifted to 
exhibitors. 
Growth of drive-in theaters over. 
Still profitable but limited in 
expansion possibilities due to 
land values. Many drive-ins 
being converted to real estate 
developments. 
Favorable economic trends plus 
shorter work week continue. 
Company acquired Eastern 
Management Chain (6 drive-ins, 
3 indoor). 
Most new construction was twin 
theaters; modern, comfortable, 
located in areas geographi-
cally accessible to suburban 
families with minimal other 
exhibitor competition. 
Company increased expansion 
of theaters in the southern 
and western regions. Place 
emphasis on holding com-
petitive position and growing 
to l)national theater chain 
and 2)largest theater chain 
in the industry. 
Acquired one drive-in theater. 
Closed three Bowling Centers 
(converted two to theaters). 
w 
w 
1967 - Board of Directors 
approved program of 
selective diversi-
fication (20% net 
return on equity) 
1968 - Began diversification: 
bought soft drink 
bottling companies 
(seventeen plants 
in seven southern and 
midwestern states) and 
television stations 
(communications) 
2 1/2 for l stock split, 
leased eight remaining 
Bowling Centers to 
Consolidated Bowling 
Corporation. 
1969 - Continued expansion 
program in theaters and 
beverage plants. Working 
capital is reduced . 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Product (film) quality and 
availability most essential 
factor in longterm profitability 
for the industry. Trend of 
acquisition of film suppliers 
by large corporations pro-
viding an infusion of capital, 
along with increased invest-
ment in film by television 
networks resulting in increased 
"product. 11 
More than 50% of population is 
under thirty and will remain so 
during the next ten years. This 
age group is high consumer of 
both movies and beverages. 
From 1968-1973, new theaters opened 
at a rate of three hundred per year. 
New trend developing with more 
· auditoriums and smaller seating 
capacity in a theater complex. 
Audience better educated and 
expect wider variety of film 
showings. 
Tight money is slowing theater 
expansion. 
Cash flow available for 
theater expansion greater 
than maximum needs of the 
company. 
Now operate theaters in 
thirty states. Concentrating 
on construction of multiple 
screen theaters. 
To capture this market must 
have even more theaters 
located for convenience and 
ease of access. 
Shift construction to three 
and four-plex theaters with 
smaller auditoriums to cater 
to varied tastes and smaller 
audience market segments. 
Find economically healthy 
market areas for further 




1970 - Acquired fifteen 
theaters 
1971 - Accelerate theater building 
program. 3-2 stock split. 
1972 - Lowest gain in net 
operating earnings in 
eleven years. Loew's 
Acquisition (47 theaters). 
(Cooperative venture-
Alpert's Furniture Retail 
Agreement for diversifi-
cation.) 
1973 - Became largest movie theater 
chain in number of theaters 
and revenue. (Also largest 
Pepsi franchiser and second 
largest independent soft 
drinks bottler.) 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Economic recession continued 
trend toward increased number 
of auditoriums and declining 
seating capacity. 
Greater variety of film, decline 
in centralized movie-making and 
rise of independents in film 
production. Overall decline 
in theater revenue due to falling 
film product and supply and con-
tinued economic recession. 
Decline in attendance at drive-ins 
due to competition from shopping 
malls and decline in availability 
of family-oriented films. 
Higher film costs- "Godfather''. 
Continued downward trend in 
drive-in attendance. 
Rise in short-term interest rates. 
Gas shortages. 
New theaters profitable i n 
first year (versus three 
years). Operate 198 units 
(246 auditoriums). Seating 
capacity has declined from 
675 to 555. 
Remodeling larger auditoriums 
into multiplexes. Automation 
of projection equipment. 
Greater emphasis on cost 
control (payroll, adver-
tising and promotion). 
Increased theater expenses; 
lowest gain in net operating 
profit in eleven years (6%). 
Drop in drive-in attendance 
for second year in a row. 
Announced intention to phase 




1974 - GCC now has an 8% market 
share for theater exhibi-
tion 
1975 - Phased out drive-ins 
Continued theater expansion 
(40% pre-tax ROI currents) 
1976 - Increased dividend payment 
for tenth consecutive year 
(cumulative increase of 
350%). Balance sheet 
adjustments accomplished 
(Debt to Total Capital 
is 39.5%). 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
General recession environment 
and rising fuel costs/trans-
portation costs increases public 
interest in leisure activities 
closer to home and led to rise 
in attendance at movies 
(substitution effect). 
Decline in theater operating 
margins due to higher film costs. 
Movie attendance up during the 
year, partly because of ''block-
buster" movies . 
Overall decline in supply of 
major new feature films, caused 
in part by the continued expansion 
of the number of new t heaters---
thus requiring an expansion of the 
supply of films. 
Decline of attendance, revenue 
and profits. 
Lack of quality and supply of 
film product. 
Theater conversion strategy 
allows more films to be 
available at existing sites. 
Declining theater operating 
margin leads company to 
shift emphasis to increased 
concession profits through 
price increases and offering 
larger size items (with 
greater profit margins). 
Restructured longterm debt, 
used internally generated 
cash flow to reduce bank debt. 
Continued decline of operating 
margins. Film rentals now 
50% of box office receipt s. 
Operating margin at 10.2% 
1 eve l . 
Entered into joint venture 
to help increase feature film 
supply (invested in some 
independent films). 
First decline in theater 
operating income in sixteen 
years. (Theater division 
profitability is not sensitive 
to inflation/ recession con-
ditions but very sensitive to 




1977 - Phased out non-profitable 
older non-shopping center 
theater units. GCC ranked 
fourteenth in Fortune 500 
return to stockholders 
(22.1 % for ten years). 
Continue growth goals for 
company. Sunkist Beverages 
development. 
TABLE IV (Continued ) 
"Star L·Jars" exhibited. Major 
increase in attendance. 
Several important trends 
continue: 
• increased avai lability of 
fi rst-run movies close to where 
people live 
• continued population 
growth in suburbs 
• greater dependence of 
exhibition industry on 
fi rst-run movies, their 
adequacy of supply and 
quality 
Because of continued increase 
in film prices and the minimum 
film rental guarantees, two 
levels of exhibit i on are evolving--
first -run with higher admission 
prices and sub-run where customers 
pay less and wait several months 
to see a film. 
20% increase in attendance . 
Now adding screens in care -
fu ll y selec t ed growth markets, 
especially i n the Sunbelt ; 
tu rn ing exi sting profitable 
locations into multi-screens. 
GCC concentr ates expansi on 
i n regional shopping mal l s. 
(80% of theaters are located 
in malls and are less than ten 
years ol d.) 
GCC elects to parti ci pate in 
first run market with higher 
film costs, leading to 
higher attendance (73 mi l lion 
patrons ), r evenue and 
operating profits but lower 
operating margins. 
As result of being first r un 
exhibitor, now developing 
multi-screen locations (have 
ten 3-plexes and six quads) 
to provide a greater choi ce 
of film. The length of 
time each feature plays is 
increasing, leading to l ess 
need for large auditorium size 
so seating capacity is being 
reduced in new complexes. 
w ......, 
1978 - Extraordinary year for 
attendance and profit-
ability. 
1979 - Discontinued film 
financing. Continued 
theater expansion. 
Examining possible new 
diversification. 
1980 - Company is building cash 
and borrowing capacity to 
position itself to make a 
sizable acquisition. 
GCC opened two 6-plex 
theaters. 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Supply of commercially 
successful films was adequate. 
More film supply available and 
sixteen states have established 
legislation prohibiting blind 
bidding. 
Refreshment sales per capita 
have grown consistently each 
year for last twenty years. 
A demographic shift to other 
adults -20 to 30+. The decline 
in the 15-20 year olds is not 
expected to greatly affect movie 
attendance. The exhibition 
industry is responding to the 
changing demographics by pro-
ducing films designed to appeal 
to all age categories. 
The continued proliferation of 
home entertainment systems 
(video, cable and pay TV). The 
growth of these systems has 
created additional sources of 
revenue for film production 
companies, thereby increasing 
the supply of film by 50% in 
the l ast 5 years. With increased 
supply Of film, a shift toward 
87 million patrons and 9.5% 
operating margins. 
Improved operating margin by 
selective ticket price in-
creases, tighter operating 
expense controls and strong 
concession sales (operating 
margin of 10.4%). 
Theater growth from 207 at 107 
locations in 1969 to 843 at 
337 locations in 1979. 
Use of theater (and beverage) 
profits to fund investment pro-
gram for diversification. 
GCC expects theater exhibition 
to remain the primary vehicle 
for release of major film 
feature releases---since this 
offers the largest overall 




l 980 ( cont in 'd) 
Launched a series of con-
cession merchandising 
promotions. 
1981 - Best year in history of 
theater division with 
attendance, revenue and 
operational earnings at 
record levels. GCC 5-year · 
increase in theater 
attendance was 49% with 
an annual compound growth 
of 8.3% (compared to 1.8% 
industry). 
Company in excellent 
financial condition. 
Debt to equity ratio 
is .77 to l, the lowest 
since 1978. 
1982 - Acquired total ownership 
in Alpert's Furniture 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
larger multiplex theaters, more 
4-plex and beginning of 6-plexes. 
Peop le continue to be better 
educ ated and more affluent. They 
want out-of-the-home entertainment. 
Strong movie attendance trend. 
Si xteen states now have anti-blind 
bidding laws. Greater expenditure 
by film companies on promotional 
activity of a a national film 
release. 
Trend toward adverse economy -
continued inflation, record high 
interest rates, new government 
policies , and concern with 
worsening recession. 
Continuing difficult economic 
environment. 
Good supply of popular film; 
better "crop" of Christmas films. 
Rising film costs. Release of 
blockbuster - "ET". 
Attendance reached 88.2 
million patrons at GCC 
theaters. Per capita sales 
of concession items continues 
to increase. Continued 
emphasis on control of 
operating costs. 
Ticket prices were held 
stable to encourage attendance. 
Strong concession promotions 
to stimulate sales. Expanded 
bargain matinee program. 
Attendance exceeded 90 
million. 
Cash flow in excess of 
required to fund growth. 
Continue to explore diversi-
fication and expansion 
possibilities in other 




Investment in Heublein, 
Inc., which then merges 
with R.J. Reynolds 
Industries. GCC received 
2,635,000 shares of Rey-
nolds common stock. 
Repurchased 1,722,800 
shares of GCC common 
stock for $73.8 million. 
1983 - GCC ranks 315 in Fortune 
500, 65th in total return 
to investors, 83 in 10-
year EP's growth; and in 
Forbes' 36th "Survey of 
American Industry" 39th 
in profitability of 
1008 companies on aver-
age return on equity. 
Debt reduced through sale 
of subordinated debentures 
exchangeable for R.J. Rey-
nolds common stock. 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Continued trend toward anti-blind 
bidding - 23 states now have laws. 
Better ability of exhibitors to 
assess/select commercially 
successful product. 
Home vi deo and pay TV continue 
to be a stimulus to film pro-
duction. 
Production companies are 
financially healthy and feature 
film supply continues to be good. 
Good film year - "Return of the 
Jedi 11 r eleased. Lower fil m costs. 
Continue to seek diversi-
fication opportunity to 
support continued growth as 
major businesses mature. 
Continue basic theater 
operating strategy of (1) 
attracting large audiences 
to theater by exhibiting a 
broad selection of first-run 
films that appeal to diverse 
audiences, ( 2) to aggress-
ively merchand i se refreshments, 
and (3) to closely control 
operating costs. 
New theater un i ts average 
6 screens per l ocation. 
Shifted from cost control and 
margin maintenance to more 
aggressive sales and market ing 
program. 
Attendance dec l ines modestly. 
Ticket prices were increased. 
Served 90 mill i on patrons, down 




Reorganization of GCC. 
Established Office of the 
Chairman with responsib-
ility for long-term 
(strategic) growth and 
diversification goals of 
the company. Financial 
general management and 
legal expertise have 
been brought together 
in this arrangement. 
P. DelRossi became Presi-
dent of GCC Theaters 
(joined company in 1980 
as Executive VP of GCC 
Theaters). A new GCC 
Theaters management 
team is created. 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Began new, increased program 
of leasing and construction 
of theaters. Older an d less 
profitable units now disposed 
of. Continued optimism about 
the theater exhibition busi-
ness. Plan to nearly 
double the number of screens 
in the next 7 years. 
+:> 
TABLE V 
GENERAL CINEMA BALANCE SHEETS 1960-1983 (in thousands) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Assets 
Current Assets 3054 3331 2406 3511 4209 5711 6397 7162 13028 
Fixed Assets 4743 7618 9089 11471 12504 15181 17872 19770 40565 
Tot al Assets 9187 12632 134 62 17656 19762 23568 27151 29876 62472 
Liabilities 
Current Liabilities 1281 2093 2057 2723 3231 4096 4941 6024 12012 
Long-Term Debt 1021 2326 2892 5627 6287 8069 9692 9510 31287 
Total Equity 6690 8055 8361 8809 9786 10842 12284 14060 18692 
Retained Earnings 5493 5798 6114 6558 6223 7248 8672 10252 14749 
Total Liability 9187 12632 13462 17656 19762 23568 27151 29876 62472 
Stock Issues 
Common Authorized 1470 - - 1837 - 5000 
Common Issued 853 918 919 920 1012 1268 1270 1291 3267 
Preferred Author. 
Preferred Issued 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Current Assets 28650 35532 41315 46869 35234 57329 91490 103571 141947 
Fixed Assets 66153 76215 82414 86307 97226 125457 150967 200712 215899 
Total Assets 153755 178999 193208 203487 201611 258372 325257 385325 441796 
Current Liab. 24751 31361 37523 41498 32965 49259 71167 85791 105788 
Long-Term Debt 60700 63404 79911 74050 65014 93473 121016 149085 155292 
Total Equity 46478 64268 73071 85574 99489 112442 128818 146217 168542 
Ret. Earnings 41403 49497 58300 70607 84489 100306 119701 136299 158211 
Total Liability 153755 178999 193208 203487 201611 258372 325257 385325 441796 
Conunon Auth . - - 15000 
Common Issued 5029 5589 5589 5589 5589 5589 5589 11072 11072 
Pref. Author . - - - - - -
Pref . Is sued 




















































GENERAL CINEMA STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS 1960- 1983 (in thousands) 
1960 l 961 1962 1963 1964 1965 l 966 1967 1968 
EaRnings 
evenue 8140 10423 12799 15637 20815 25163 33672 42386 71671 
Expenses 6964 9383 11546 14155 18655 22661 30622 23464 63575 
Operating Income 1176 1040 1253 1482 2161 2502 3049 3491 8095 
NIBT 1268 1128 1287 1539 2208 2533 3058 3530 8146 
Taxes 486 427 516 520 891 1069 1248 1322 3810 
NIAT 782 701 771 919 1317 l 564 1810 2208 4336 
Net Income 870 727 770 903 1437 1695 1982 2286 4988 
Per Share 
Earnings l. 03 .79 .84 .98 l. 42 l. 30 l. 59 1.85 l. 54 
Book Value 7.88 9.58 g,57 8.57 9.57 10.89 5.75 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1975 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Revenue 197015 245466 299514 358447 365315 455065 594857 655100 759400 
Expenses 182502 230495 281002 322578 327921 418512 529222 589895 685522 
Oper. Income 14513 14970 18512 35759 37921 46554 55535 56205 73878 
NIBT 14513 14790 18512 28318 31390 36667 44910 541 21 60255 
Taxes 5997 6350 7923 13449 14335 16437 20299 23489 26891 
NIAT 8778 8846 10589 14869 17055 20230 24611 30632 33354 
Net Income 9213 9442 11057 14869 17055 20230 2451 1 25472 29931 
Earnings l.80 1.69 2.01 2.58 3.04 3. 64 4.43 2.41 2.72 
Book Value 9.42 11.69 13.29 15 . 51 18.02 20.32 23.54 13.32 l 5. 34 












































GENERAL CINEMA DIVISIONAL REVENUE AND INCOME PERFORMANCE 1968-1983 (in thousands) 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975* 
Divisional Income 
Revenues 
Theaters 54108 57698 69588 80315 99763 117607 142873 180006 




Theaters 6644 7680 9510 l 0316 11126 10169 10386 18434 
Beverage 1452 2935 3044 4235 3387 5027 8126 17335 
Comm./Other 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Revenues 
Theaters 168391 213757 266369 266461 307776 323200 343914 353099 
Beverage 188935 240415 315156 364836 412321 445012 451462 473140 
Comm./Other 7989 10894 13332 17499 20846 25102 50523 55723 
Sunkist 9625 21643 33775 44445 51054 
NI Operating 
Theaters 13420 14346 25200 27745 27494 31034 32219 35505 
Beverage 22556 29913 37385 46197 54018 59004 61229 63121 
Comrn./Other 1945 2295 3050 3159 4059 6716 10389 5901 
Sunkist (10896) (11693) (4749) 801 1603 
~ 
~ 
*reclassification of items 
Source: Annual Report 1960-1983 
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TABLE VIII 
GENERAL CINEMA RATIO ANALYSIS 1960-1983 
Ratios* 
Liquidity Profitability( %) 
Year Current Ratio ~et Profit Margin ROI ROi: 
1960 2.38 . 16 . 14 . 12 
1961 l.63 . 11 .09 .09 
1962 l. 17 . l 0 . l 0 .09 
1963 l. 29 . l 0 .09 . l 0 
1964 l. 30 . 11 . 11 . 13 
1965 l. 39 . l 0 . 11 . 14 
1966 l. 29 .09 . 11 . 15 
1967 L 19 . 08 . 12 . 16 
1968 1. 08 . 11 . 13 .23 
1969 1. 14 . 08 . 11 . 21 
1970 1. 16 .08 . 11 .22 
1971 1. 13 .08 . 12 . 21 
1972 l. 16 .07 .09 . 19 
1973 1. 13 . 06 .08 . 14 
1974 1. l 0 .06 . l 0 . 14 
1975 1. 13 .08 . 14 . 17 
1976 1.07 .09 . 16 . 17 
1977 l. 16 .08 . 14 . 18 
1978 l. 29 .08 . 14 . 19 
1979 l. 21 . 08 . 14 .21 
1980 l. 34 .08 . 14 .20 
1981 1. 45 . l 0 . 16 .22 
1982 1. 00 .09 . 14 .28 
1983 .80 . 17 .25 .38 
*Current Ratio - Current Assets/Current Liabilities 
Net Profit Margin= NIST/Revenue 
ROI= NIST/ Total Assets 
ROE= NIAT/Total Equity 
Debt Ratio= Total Debt/Total Assets 
Debt Equity= Long Term Debt/Total Equity 
Leverage (%) 
De6t Ratio De6t Equity 









.70 l. 73 
.52 l. 16 
. 51 1.00 
.56 l. 30 
.53 .99 





. 61 1.02 
.59 .92 
. 57 . 77 
.69 l. 67 
.52 .54 
with revenues of $8. 1 million and net income of $.87 million. By 1983 
these figures had grown to $259 million in equity, with revenues of 
$928.6 million and net income of $98.5 million. 
General Cinema's growth has occurred through operational expans i on 
and by acquisition. The C0mpany is described by various internal and 
external sources as a strong operations and finance company. Figure 5 
depicts major growth patterns. Inthe earlier years growth occurred 
primarily through expansion of drive-ins and construction of shopping 
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mall theaters and bowling alleys. Growth by acquisition occurred f i rst 
with drive-in theaters. As the cost of land and const ruction increased, 
the company shifted to acquiring drive-in theaters during the mi d '60's 
(1 963, 1965, 1966). The shift to major growth by acquisition (1968) 
was also a shift in strategy to diversification as a means of new 
growth. This strategy had been attempted with bowling alleys (con-
struction and operation) but the bowling operation never proved 
profitable. By 1968 the bowling alleys had either been leased for 
operation by other companies or were being converted to theaters. The 
shift to a strategy of growth by diversification through acquisition, 
e.g. bottling and communications, was influenced by the growth goals 
of the company. By 1968 theaters generated considerable cash in excess 
of that required to fund continued theater expansion. In the 1967 
Annual Report Mr. Richard Smith, President, states: 
At a special meeting of stockholders on December 18, 1967, 
we obtained approval to broaden the Company's corporate 
purposes. We are now firmly committed to a program of 
selective diversification. 
Figure 6shows the pattern of diversification for General Cinema. 
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Miami 7-Up Bottling Company ($1 million), Pepsi-Cola Allied Bottler, 
Inc. ($8.4 million), the Pepsi franchises for Cleveland ($4.9 million) 
and several other smaller companies, combined, positioned General 
Cinema in the south and midwest with seventeen plants in seven states. 
Revenues and profitability of the General Cinema businesses from 
1960-1983 are provided in Table 7 and Figures 7-12 . Net income for 
bottling became greater than net income from theaters in 1976. Exam-
ination of these tables and figures reveals that the company now has 
two major businesses: theaters and beverages. 
In 1978 the Company again began an active search for new business 
acquisitions as a source of future profitability. Various Annual 
Reports offer definitions of their business: 
1960 - Leisure Time Industry - Family Recreation 
1960 - Leisure Time Entertainment 
1964 - Leisure Time - Family Oriented Entertainment 
1975 - Leisure Oriented Consumer Business 
In its search for acquisitions and diversification, several char-
acteristics of desirable businesses have been articulated by General 
Cinema: 
l. The business is marketing oiiented and not too technical or 
prone to obsolescence. 
2. The products are aimed at the youth and affluent markets, 
a large consumer base. 
3. The operations are strong, decentralized and regional / 
national in scope. 
4. The emphasis is on services with sales benefiting from 
customer leisure time. 
5. There is potential for expansion (either by new growth 
or acquisition). 
6. The products provide relatively inexpensive pleasure and 
satisfaction to the public. 
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7. There is little or no regulation. 
8. Operations have a protected base of exclusivity by 
location or franchise (high barrier to entry). 
9. Neither inflation nor recession environments greatly 
affect earnings---sales growth is more a function of 
the quality and supply of the product. 
10. The business should have the potential for a 15% or more 
annual growth in earnings, and a 20% or more return on 
additional capital employed. 
The Annual Reports (1960-1983) are a rich source of information 
on the intended goals and strategies of General Cinema. Many of the 
major strategy shifts may be identified using a chronological tracking 
method wi th these documents. Table 9 lists by year the significant 
goal and strategy statements contained in the Annual Reports. 
In the early years, the Company grew slowly. Emphasis was on 
defining the business, goal specification and developing the know-
ledge and skills assoc i ated with mall development. Many of these 
early goals had to do with growth, and with financial philosophy 
(creation of value and dividend policies). 
More recent specification has concentrated on new strategy formu-
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lation and refinements of strategy to accomplish the long term company 
goals. The pattern of General Cinema 1 s growth strategy may be 
summarized as: Find a consumer growth business where we can 1) man-
age the expansion of the business through strong operations and product 
adaptation/innovation and 2) consolidate the business on a reg ional/ 
national basis (by niching), and then use the excess funds generated 
to search for and acquire a new business (consumer-leisure ori ented) 




GENERAL CINEMA GOAL AND STRATEGY STATEME NTS 1960-1983* 
Goal Statement 
1960 - Enter leisure time 
growth fields 
Become the largest 
shopping center theater 
chain in the country 
1961 - Expand by planned diver-
sified growth 
1964 - Become a national 
theater chain and the 
largest theater chain 
Maintain strong policy of 
dividend payment and shar-
ing profit growth with 
stockholders (also 1976) 
1966 - Achieve net return on 
stockholder equity of 20% 
1968-69 
1975-76 
Establish expansion plan 
through acquistions and 
new operations growth 
Strategy Statemen t 
Position company to capi talize on 
suburban population growth and leisure 
time trends 
Begin major expansion program 
Establish year around balanced cash 
flow with/between drive-ins and bowling. 
Have geographic diversity to protect 
earnings against loss (due to 
weather) 
Establish and hold competitive posi-
tion through 
• early entry 
• pace-setting expansion 
• ability to obtain excellent sites 
• concentrated growth in best 
markets/regional growth areas 
Establish strategy for regional mar-
keting impact. Acquire/consolidate 
non-competitive franchises into strong 
regional entity. 
Expand theaters (plexing) and offer a 
large number of constantly changing 
films to encourage and develop 
regular theater going habits. 





Manage GCC as a 
growth company . 
tain 15% average 
rate of earnings 
into mid-1980's 
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Maintain growth through acquis i tions, 
new diversif i cation and operations 
expansion 
Find businesses that "fit" and expand 
through strong regional operati ons and 
innovation 
Continue to strengthen leadership 
position in existing businesses and 
expand scope of operations t o other 
consumer products and services 
Use acquisitions to create val ue not 
size 
Major strategy shift in existing 
businesses from emphasis on cost 
control and margin maintenance to 
more aggressive sales and marketing 
programs. 
*Source: Annual Report 1960-1983. 
Comments in the 1982 and 1983 Annual Reports further explicate 
General Cinema's growth strategies and philosophy: 
(1) There is a growing recognition that the true value of 
an enterprise is dependent upon its ability to generate a 
cash return, not just reportable earnings. For this reason, 
we have directed the Company's resources into consumer-related 
businesses with above average growth potential that generate 
significant cash earnings, earnings that are available for 
reinvestment in new or expanded activities to augment the 
Company's future growth. 
Management rigorously applies the creation of value 
concept to General Cinema ' s diversification efforts. Besides 
seeking businesses that generate cash earnings, we attempt to 
acquire them at prices which do not already fully reflect 
their future growth potential. 
As our businesses grow, and their earnings and cash gen-
erating capacity expand, they appreciate significantly in 
value. Today, General Cinema's businesses have a 'real' market 
value substantially in excess of their book value, which is 
based on historical cost. 
Management believes that the creation of a consistent 
and expanding cash flow and earnings base will over time be 
recognized in the investment community and that this recog-
nition will be reflected in a growing market value for the 
Company's shares. The strength and consistency of this cash 
flow have also enabled the Company to judiciously use leverage. 
Management has kept the number of common and common equivalent 
shares outstanding, adjusted for stock splits and stock 
dividends, virtually constant since the Company went public 
in 1960. As a result, shareholder equity has not been 
diluted and, on a per share basis, both cash flow and earnings 
have continued to rise consistently over a long period of time. 
Due to the fact that General Cinema's businesses generate 
cash earnings significantly in excess of the funds required to 
sustain their internal growth, General Cinema has had a long-
standing policy of sharing its earnings growth with share-
holders through increasing cash dividends. Several years ago, 
the Board of Directors formulated a policy of paying dividends 
equivalent to 25-30% of earnings. As a result, cash dividends 
have increased significantly each year as earnings have 
grown. During the last five years the annual cash dividend 
rate has increased an average of 18.8% per year. 
Management remains committed to its basic philosophy of · 
building the Company's asset base and further enhancing its 
earning power and cash flow. By adhering to this principle, 
we believe the Company can accomplish its primary objective 
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of creating lasting value by providing our shareholders 
with a total return--- appreciation in the market value of 
General Cinema shares plus cash dividends---well in 
excess of the inflation rate and commensurate with that 
of a leading growth company (1982 Annual Report, p. 6-7). 
(2) General Cinema's growth has been based on the 
creation of value for our shareholders. Using the cash-
generating capacity of the Theater Division, 13 years ago 
we initiated an acquisition program in the soft drink 
industry which eventually positioned the Company as the 
largest independent bottler in the country. The soft 
drink business sustained our growth throughout the past 
decade, and today the value of our exclusive franchises far 
exceeds our acquisition costs. In 1969 we made an invest-
ment in a struggling independent television station in 
Miami. Through subsequent investments we assumed control 
in 1974. Today WC IX-TV is an important earnings con-
tributor to Genera l Cinema and has increased in value 
dramatically. Simi larly, we have invested almost 
$34 million pretax during the past four years in Sunkist 
Soft Drinks. In doing so, we have made Sunkist Orange 
Soda a viable national brand, with probably the strongest 
distribution network in the industry, and successfully 
introduced a companion sugar-free product, Diet Sunkist. 
The value of Sunkist today far exceeds our investment, 
and its earnings potential will enhance General 
Cinema's ability to sustain its growth in the l980's. 
Our primary corporate objective continues to be to 
maintain the Company's growth momentum. If that can 
be achieved, we believe we will continue to create 
incremental equity value for our shareholders (1983 
Annual Report, p. 2). 
Theater Growth Strategies 
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When General Cinema Corporation (originally called Midwest Orive-
In) became a public corporation in 1960 the company operated t wenty-six 
drive-in theaters in twelve states and nineteen indoor theaters l ocated 
principally in New England and Florida. After World War II indoor 
theater growth declined from 18,000 to less than 10,000 wh ile drive-in 
theaters experienced rapid growth, increasing by over 2000 screens 
during the 1950's. See Table 10. By 1960 drive-ins were 30% of the 
TABLE X 
NUMBER OF THEATER SCREENS IN THE U.S. 1948-1983 
Indoor Drive-In 
1948 ( l ) 17,811 820 
1954 ( l) 14,716 3,775 
1958 ( 1) 12,291 4,063 
1963 ( 1) 9,150 3,502 
1964 ( 2) 9,200 3,540 
1965 ( 2) 9,240 3,585 
1966 ( 2) 9,290 3,640 
1967 ( 2) 9,330 3,670 
1968 (2) 9,500 3,690 
1969 (2) 9,750 3,730 
1970 ( 2) 10,000 3,750 
1971 (2) 10,300 3,770 
1972 ( 2) 10,580 3,790 
1973 ( 2) 10,850 3,800 
1974 ( 2) 11,612 3,772 
1975 ( 2) 12,168 3,801 
1976 (2) 12,562 3,414 
1977 ( 2) 12,990 3,564 
1978 ( 2) 1 3, 129 3,626 
*1979 ( 2) 13,329 3,636 
**1983 (3) 
Source: (l) U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census. 
(2) Estimates from various sources. 
** (3) Variety 1/11/84. 
























screens in the industry. For the first few years of operation, 
the Company continued to construct drive-ins, but by 1963 had shifted 
to acquisition for any further growth. As shown in Figure 13, as 
revenues began to decline after 1970, the Company started to phase 
out of its (unprofitable) drive-in operations. Table 11 and Figures 
14-15 show the yearly growth in new screens for General Cinema 
theaters. 
Most of the General Cinema growth in theater screens was in 
regional shopping malls. New theaters in malls grew slowly during 
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the first part of the 1960's and then gained momentum during the latter 
part of the 1960's. Table 12 and Figure 16 indicate the number 
of yearly theater openings and closings. Theater openings increased 
rapidly during the first half of the 1970's and remained stable at 
between 60 to 80 new theater openings per year through 1983. (The 
company plans to double its total number of screens by the end of this 
decade. This implies a growth rate of greater than 100 screens each 
year for the next six years.) 
The major approach to strategy formation in the 1960's focused on 
competing with television and other forms of leisure time activities. 
General Cinema did this by providing relatively inexpensive enter-
tainment through the building and operating of clean, comfortable 
theaters in conveniently located shopping malls that had adequate 
parking facilities. By the mid 1960's more emphasis was placed on 
providing patrons with a choice of billings (film) at the same 
location. Strategy formation in the 1970's was influenced by General 
Cinema's success in l) attracting a higher patron attendance than 
the industry, 2) having new theaters become profitabl e i n the first 
63 
General Cinema Theaters 
Drive-In Growth Strategies 
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fi gure 13 
TABLE XI 
GE NERAL CINEMA THEATER EXPANSION FROM 1960-1983 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Theaters - Totals 49 54 54 72 74 96 129 148 
fn"11aTls 5 10 10 20 25 46 69 89 
Suburban 18 18 18 20 15 14 14 11 
Drive-In 26 26 26 32 34 36 46 48 
Theaters Under 9 17 10 17 31 33 32 36 
----ronst/ProJected 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Total 419 490 563 612 663 739 791 843 
TnAalls 370 444 528 592 652 728 791 843 
Suburban 
Drive-In 49 46 35 20 l1 11 9 7 
Under Const / Proj . 164 155 143 120 165 138 129 126 
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TABLE XII 
GENERAL CINEMA THEATER OPENINGS AND CLOSJNGS 1961-1983 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Theaters Opened Closed Open Clos Open Clos Open Clos Open Clos Open Cl os 
Indoor 
Suburb/Resort 0 0 +l 0 3 -2 0 -5 0 - 1 +l - 1 
Shopping Ma 11 4 - -1 12 0 5 0 21 0 +23 0 
Drive-In +l 0 0 0 9 -3 5 -3 7 -5 +15 -5 
Total +5 0 +l -1 +24 -5 10 -8 28 -6 +39 -6 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Indoor 
Oeened Closed Open Clos Open Clos Open Clos Open Clos Open Clos 
Suburb/Resort 0 -9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Shopping Ma 11 +41 0 92 0 123 D +95 -21 +84 0 +64 0 
Drive-In +l 0 +2 0 +O -1 . 0 -3 D -11 0 -15 
Total +42 -9 +94 0 +123 -1 95 -24 +84 -11 +64 -15 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Opened Closed Open Clos Open Clos Deen Clos _Q_een Clos 
Indoor 
Suburb/Resort 
Shopping Mall 65 -13 73 0 65 -14 66 -29 64 -34 
Drive-In -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total +65 -13 73 0 65 -14 66 -29 +64 -34 
1967 1968 
Open Clos Open Clos 
0 -3 0 -2 
+20 0 +14 0 
+3 -2 +l 0 
+23 -5 15 -2 
-
1976 1977 
Open Clos Open Cl os 
0 0 0 0 
61 -1 81 -5 
0 -9 0 0 
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year of operation (compared to three years in the early 1960's ) , and 
3) a deep appreciation that the theater exhibition business was not 
greatly affected by either inflation or recession but rather by the 
quality and supply of product (film) . Strategy formation centered 
around competing for a larger portion of the expanding disposible 
personal income. General Cinema's strategies concentrated on bu i lding 
theaters with more auditoriums to offer a greater variety of first run 
films at each theater location, thereby being able to provide greater 
market segmentation. 
In the 1980's General Cinema shifted to a market l eader strategy. 
This strategy focuses on 1) addressing the exhibitor location com-
petition through estab l ishing and controlling film zones (a film 
zone is defined as an area that has 16-18 screens) and 2) pace setting 
new construction, multiplexing and location clustering. Table 13 
lists many of the theater strategy statements that are found in the 
Annual Reports and other documents. 
This chronology was used to identify a set of theater related 
growth strategies. Table 14 shows the geographic and location growth 
in theaters between 1960-1983. During this 23 year time peri od 
General Cinema Theaters expanded from 39 locations in 17 states to 
336 locations (down from 350 locat i ons in 1981) in 39 states and 
the District of Columbia. Figure 17 shows t hat during the 1960 ' s 
emphas is was placed on the use of a geographic dispersion strategy 
to position General Cinema as a nati onal theater exhibition company. 
This strategy continued into the 1970 ' s but emphasis shifted to 
location expansion through l ocation conversions and new theater 















GENERAL CINEMA THEATER STRATEGY STATEMENTS 1960-1983 
Strategy 
Concentrate theater growth in geographically 
diverse shopping centers located near suburban 
growth areas. 
Shift drive-in expansion from construction to 
acquisition. Build twins (Cinema I and II) to 
provide greater film variety at same location, 
attract more movie-goers. 
Locate in geographically accessable malls with 
minimal other exhibitor competition. 
Increase competitive position through early entry, 
pace setting expansion, and continued ability to 
obtain excellent sites. 
Offer a large number of constantly changing 
billings to encourage and develop regular theater-
going habits. Shift expansion to construction of 
3-4 plexes with smaller auditoriums. Locate new 
theaters in carefully selected sites in regionally 
healthy markets. 
Expand geographically through acquisitions. 
Begin to convert existing profitable locations 
to multiplexes to provide more first run films 
at each location. 
Phase out and discontinue unprofitable operations 
(get out of drive-in business). 
Increase attention to cost control to cope with 
declining operating margins. 
Shift profit emphasis from tickets to concessions. 
Introduce larger drink, candy and popcorn sizes 
and increase markup and per item profitability. 
Enter joint venture for feature film production 
to increase available supply of first run films. 
Target first run exhibition markets--continue 
multiplexing to maintain position of first run 
exhibitor. Add screens in Sunbelt and other 
carefully selected markets. Introduce concept 







TABLE XIII (Continued) 
To offset higher film costs and declining profit 
margins, improve operating margin by selective 
price increases in tickets, tight operating 
expense control and i ncrease concession sales 
by implementing a comprehensive refreshment 
marketing program. 
Continue to strengthen leadership position 
through strong operations management and through 
the use of a protected base of exclusivity of 
unique locations in regional shopping malls. 
As real estate costs increase company negotiates 
ground leases or leaseback arrangements. 
Begin finding developers to create auxiliary 
shopping malls near regional malls for access/ 
control of f i lm zones. 
Fi nd new markets before construction of new 
regional mall. Ident i fy where new mall wil l 
be located and build large multiplex at 
proximate location. Then also build in mall 
when it is constructed--to gain control of 
a film zone. 
Implement pace setting new theater construction 
program to mai~tain leadership positi on . Shift 
concession standsfromfree flow to stat ions to 
serve more customers and increase profi tability. 
Reorganize Theater Division to establ ish a 
strong market i ng and promotion capability. 
Increase emphasis on decentralized operations. 




GENERAL CINEMA THEATER GEOGRAPHIC AND LOCATION GROWTH 1960-1983 
Year Total Theaters Total Locations Total States 










1970 203 (107 cities) 30 
1971 297 220 30 





1977 739 335 
1978 791 337 
1979 843 337 
1980 916 347 39 + DC 
1981 976 350 
1982 1004 345 
1983 1034 336 
Source: Annual Report 1960- 1983 
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Figure 17 
Location was considered to be crucial in determining a 
theater's success. In addition to the market research per-
formed by the leading retailers in a new shopping center, 
management was particularly concerned about the economics 
of film procurement. 
Other variables of concern in the selection were construction and 
operating costs, ticket pricing, and attendance and refreshment 
revenue. Only locations which offered a 20% return on initial 
investment after taxes were selected. 
74 
Beginning in the 1980's greater emphasis is being given to l)location 
clustering to position for future growth in profitable regional mar-
kets, and 2) for film zone control. Figure 18 shows specific 
geographic expansion strategies used by General Cinema. Most geo-
graphic expansion has been through regional malls, but during the 
early 1970's, General Cinema acquired theaters (Mann and Loews) which 
gave them access to new geographic locations in Los Angeles, Florida, 
Arizona, and New Mexico. Figure 19 shows the shifts in auditorium 
design strategy which accompanied other theater growth strategies and 
environmental/demographic changes. Table 15 shows that the trend of 
"plexing" found in Figure 19 is increasing in the 1980's. Most new 
theater construction has six, eight, or ten-plex designs. See 
also Table 16. 
Real Estate Strategies 
During the early part of the 1960's the Company continued to own 
the land for drive-ins and bowling alleys (Figure 20). As the costs 
of land increased they shifted to an acquisition strategy for con-
tinued drive-in growth. As drive-ins and bowling alleys became 
unprofitable the land was sold for regional mall development (and 
General Cinema Theaters 
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GENERAL CINEMA THEATER MULTIPLEX EXPANSION 1979-1983 
Year* Multiplex (Number of Screens) Auditorium Location New Locat. Closed 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total Total Locat. Split 
1979 23 338 312 140 30 0 0 0 843 337 
1980 21 312 342 164 65 12 0 0 916 347 56 19 2 
1981 15 300 333 224 65 30 0 0 976 350 46 19 14 
1982 13 276 321 232 75 72 7 8 1004 345 54 8 29 
1983 9 252 285 264 100 102 14 8 l 034 336 44 19 33 
*Twin construction began in 1962. In 1965 General Cinema had 21 single theaters and 15 twin 
theaters in shopping malls. 
Source: Internal Theater Reports 1980-1983 
-....J 
-....J 
TABLE XV I 
TOP TEN U.S . THEATER CIRCUI TS 1983 
Top 10 Circuit Headquarters Screen Total Location Number of Stat es in Order 
As of Total Drive-I n of Greatest 
12/31 / 83 Scr eens Sc reen Presence 
1. Genera l Cinema Chestnut Hi ll , Mass . 1,050 360 7 30 st ates, D.C. 
2. Uni ted Artists East Meadow, NY/ 1,005 339 54 25 states , P.R. 
Communicat i ons San Franci sco 
3. Amer ican Multi - Kansas City 736 146 0 26 states 
Cinema 
4. Plitt Los Angel es 605+ 286 0 I 11 . , Ca l . , Minn. , 
Mi ch. ,Ariz . ,more 
5. Martin Columbus, Ga. 431 201 57 Ga.,Tenn .,Tex. , 
Ala . ,N .C. ,More 
6. Commonwealth Kansas City 362 215 63 Kan. ,Colo . , Mo. 
N. M. ,Ark. ,more 
7. Mann Los Ange l es 315 101 l Cal. ,Ari z. ,Colo. , 
Utah ,Tex. 
8. Redstone Boston 302 84 53 Mass.,Mich . , N. Y., 
Ohio, Pa. ,more 
9. Cobb Bi rmingham, Al a. 255 75 4 F 1 a. , A 1 a. , Ga. , Mi s s . , 
Tenn . , P. R. , V. I. 
10. Tom Moyer Port land, Ore. 235 90 B Ore . ,Wash. , ldaho, 
Nev. ,Cal. 
Next 20 (average number) 166 59 
Source : Variet1_, Wednesday, January 11, 1984 
GROWTH 
New Screens 
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fi gure 20 
the Company located a theater in the mall). Several bowling alleys 
were converted to twin theaters. Most shopping center theaters were 
"built to suit" with fixed-plus-percentage rental arrangements with 
center developers. In the mid 1970's construction costs led many 
developers to require that renters actually invest in the buildings. 
In time there was a rise in long term ground leases with lease back 
and resale. options. Toward the end of the l970's General Cinema 
began to examine market growth opportunities for various regional 
malls around the United States (where screen supply was anderbuilt). 
They frequently sought out developers who would finance an "auxiliary" 
mall at the desirable site. General Cinema would then locate a 
multiplex theater in this auxiliary mall. The latest real estate 
strategy leads regional mall development. The company finds a site 
where a future regional mall is planned and then finds a developer 
to build a theater multiplex before the regional mall is constructed. 
General Cinema also tries to position itself so that later when the 
mall is built, they are able to negotiate for theaters in the mall, 
thereby giving the company control. of a film zone. 
Concession Strategies 
In the early 1970's General Cinema Corporation began experiencing 
declining operating margins in their theaters (Table 17). In l arge 
part this was due to declining quality and supply of film, and the 
higher rental costs associated with "blockbusters." The trend of 
rising film costs continued throughout the 1970's l eading to con-
cessions becoming the major source of profits to the Company. Figure 




GENERAL CINEMA OPERATING MARGI NS (PERCENT) FOR 1979-1983 
Operating Margin by Year 
Unit 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Theater* 10.4% 8.9% 9.6% 9.4% l O. 1 % 
Beverage 12.7 13. 1 13.3 13 . 6 13 . 3 
Communications 19.3 18.8 23. l 20.6 10. 6 
Sunkist 1. 8 3. 1 
*Theater Divisions 
1972 6% 
1975 10 .2% 
1977 6.7% 
1978 9. 5% 
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Sources of Prof it 
Box Office Receipts 
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 :32 83 
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Figure 21 
profits. By 1975 film rentals were 50% of box office receipts. 
Because the per capita sales at concession stands had been rising 
for quite a few years, thereby leading to generally increasing 
concession profits, the Company appears to have been slow in 
recognizing the need to develop aggressive new concession strategies. 
The major strategy shift occurred in 1974 where larger sizes of con-
tainers were developed (candy, popcorn and drinks) with higher 
prices and larger profit margins per item. This was an industry 
trend. Little mention of concessions appears in the Annual Reports. 
The 1979 Annual Report notes, " ... the successful implementation of a 
comprehensive refreshment marketing program." The Company emphasized 
cost (operational) control over new concession design and technology. 
For concessions few major changes appear to have occurred until 
the l980's. The Company is now shifting to a station versus t he 
previous free flow approach to serving customers. the Company 
(Figure 22) is now moving to a more aggressive sa l es and marketing 
strategy, as well as new concession stand designs for new theaters. 
Environment 
83 
Figure 23 shows that General Cinema has been very sensitive to the 
consumer environment and to the changing trends in this area. The 1965 
Annual Report discussed these favorable trends and economic cli mate: 
l) rapid population growth concent r ated in the suburbs, 2) rising 
disposable income with more being spent on entertainment, 3) shorter 
work week, and 4) growth of movie-going age groups (teens and young 
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At this juncture in the Twentieth Century, the youth-
ful segment of the American population has become an 
important, affluent and growing consumer market. General 
Cinema's operations while designed for broad consumer 
acceptance, are especially prepared to service the youth 
market in the years ahead. More than half the popu-
lation of our nation is under 30 and will still remain 
under 30 in the next 10 years---providing bright prospects 
for our theaters and beverage business, which will cater 
particularly to this age group. 
Mr. Smith sees this resulting in a rising audience demand for 
variety, leading to smaller markets and market segmentation of film 
showings. General Cinema ' s strategy was to f ind economically healthy 
market areas and build multiplex theaters to cater to varied tastes 
of the audiences of the 1970's. 
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Figure 24 identifies many of the significant environmental factors. 
General Cinema has been quick to identify ch anges in the environment 
and develop new strategies (drive-ins, shopping center theaters, 
mu1tip1ex auditoriums). As the regional malls expanded and the 
theaters were able to attract more first run features, theater 
attendance shifted to the malls. The period from 1968-1973 was one 
of rapid exhibitor expansion. In 1973 General Cinema became t he 
industry leader. With the rising cost of gas and cycles of recession/ 
inflation, many ind i viduals "substituted" movies for other more 
expensive forms of recreation or entertainment. The trend to multi-
plexing (Table 15) started in the 1970's and is expected to continue 
through the 1980's. 
In the 1977 Annual Report, Mr. Smith examines the major industry 
and demographic trends that have impacted exhibitor and General Cinema 
strategy. First is the continued growth of the suburbs. General 
Cinema has concentrated its expansion in regional shopping malls. In 
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Figure 24 
1977 80% of General Cinema's theaters are located in or near regional 
shopping centers and are less than ten years old. This has resulted 
in a shift of first run movies to where people live. Second is the 
effect of changing family demographics, i nflation and rising energy 
costs on theater exhibition. Drive-ins are no longer family enter-
tai nment centers. General Cinema has phased out their drive-in 
operation as they become unprofitable. They have also increased 
multiplexing to offer the patron more variety at the same location. 
Third is the increased dependence of the industry on first-run and 
blockbuster films. The 1970's has also experienced a generally less 
than adequate supply of film and rising film rental costs. A two 
tier exhibition system has evolved---with General Cinema electing 
to participate primarily in the first run market with higher film 
costs ( 1977: 12): 
We have consciously chosen this course which maximizes 
revenues, attendance and operating profits, although 
margins are reduced. 
General Cinema effected a strategy of more market targeting and 
segmentation through increased multiplexing of existing theaters 
(conversion) and new theater construction. To improve operating 
margins they l) implemented comprehensive refreshment marketing pro-
grams, 2) controlled operating expenses, and 3) selectively increased 
ticket prices. 
During the latter part of the 1970's the home video and pay/cable 
88 
television markets began to expand more rapidly. Many industry analysts 
have argued that tel evi si on woul ct eventually be the "demise" of theater 
exhibition. In the 1979 Annual Report Mr. Smith comments: 
We believe that the growth of home entertainment 
systems such as video disks, video cassettes, cable and 
pay TV is a long range benefit to motion picture exhibitors, 
because it will encourage increased film production. In 
our opinion, the increase in production activ i ty over the 
last several years bears out this belief. Production com-
panies previously have been unable or unwilling to assume 
the higher financia l risk of producing films when 
revenues and profits were unpredictable. We believe a 
larger number of exhibition channels will i ncrease the 
revenue generating potential for producers of feature 
films thereby improving their potential return on 
investment, and encouraging them to produce more product. 
The importance of the initial exposure of a film in the 
conventional movie theater cannot be overemphasized. 
Historically, the more successful the film in its 
original release, the more valuable it becomes to all 
other delivery systems. This wou l d also pertain to the 
large ancillary market, free network television, which 
has had relatively little comparative success with 'made 
for TV films' (1977:10). 
Financing Strategies 
The financing strategies of General Cinema Corporation are 
presented in Figure 29. In 1960 the company went public with a $2.25 
million, 180,000 share offering. The growth in common and preferred 
stocks is shown in Table 5. In addition to the f amily control l ed 
stock, nearly a third of the stock was held by inst i tutional in-
vestors. Sale of stock and internal financing have been two major 
sources of capital. Additional debt financing was undertaken as 
needed to finance expansion and acquisitions. Two long term fin-
ancing strategies have been to improve thedebtequity ratio (Table 8) 
and to improve liquidity by spreading debt maturities. In the late 
1970's debt was spread by shifting some of the bank borrowing 
($30 million) to private placement (fifteen year senior notes at 
11 %) • 
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Film Environment 
The trend of multiplexing increased the demand for first run 
movies, as the supply was falling (Table 18; Figures 25, 26 and 27). 
Film costs were escalating from inadequate supply and rental fees on 
"blockbusters." As a result of fluctuating quality and of supply 
of film, theater operating margins were also less stable (Table 17). 
There is a constant theme running through all the annual reports 
that theater exhibition is inflation and recession resistant. What 
drives the industry is the quality and availability of film (Annual 
Report 1976: 11 ) : 
We believe the growth of the movie exhibition industry is 
only constrained by the availability and quality of product. 
Given the necessary product, the industry and General Cinema's 
Theater Division will continue to grow. 
As the supply of film increased in the latter part of the 1970 ' s 
(plus the "Star Wars" series and "ET") General Cinema began to add 
screens in carefully selected growth markets, especially in the 
Sunbelt, and to continue to multiplex existing profitable locations. 
They have also regionalized and strengthened their film buyer capa-
bility within the company. While emphasis in the 1980's will remain 
strong for operational and real estate strategies, the importance of 
film and concession strategies to maintain a competitive market 
leader position will increase. This shift is observed in some of 
the organization changes which occurred within General Cinema during 
1983. 
Organization Structure 
In the evo l ution of the organization structure, underpinning all 
changes has been the constancy of family control of ownership. A 
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TABLE XVIII 
U.S. AND FOREIGN FILM PRODUCTION 1973-1983 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
U.S. Production 
Majors/Minors 74 58 54 58 70 60 77 76 81 50 74 
Independents 77 85 44 50 73 60 45 49 45 29 67 
- - - - - - -
Total 151 143 98 108 143 120 122 125 126 79 141 
Foreign Production 
Major/Minors 28 32 26 24 22 20 22 27 20 35 46 
Independents 40 63 52 42 61 63 l 04 57 59 70 62 
- - - - - -
Total 68 95 78 66 83 83 126 84 79 105 l 08 
Grand Total 219 238 176 174 226 203 248 209 205 184 249 
Source: Variety, January 3 (1984:26) 
I..O 
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second major force has been this same family control of corporate 
leadership. As the Company has grown and diversified (Figure 28) 
some operations control has been delegated. 
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With the continued geographic and location expansion of theaters 
and the acquisition and growth of a second major operations area 
(beverage), the organization structure gradually became more complex. 
In the late 1960's into the 1970's functional department grew to meet 
the expanded operational requirements. As theater and bottling oper-
ations continued their rapid expansion during the first half of the 
1970's, central office staff increased. The Home Office staff had 
increased supervisory responsibility. Staff departments were esta-
blished within the corporate offices. Policies and procedures began 
to be formalized and communicated to the field through regional staff, 
housed in the Home Office. 
In 1975 Operational Divisions were established (Table 19) and a 
distinction made between Corporate and Operating Officers ITable 20). 
The position President of the Theater Division was established. Thi s 
position was also a corporate vice-president. Theater operating vice-
presidents were no longer considered corporate officers. 
Within the divisions attention shifted to defining and gaining 
better operational control at a regional level. Further "divisionali-
zation" increased within higher growth regions, especially those 
regions where multiplexing was occurring most rapidly. 
At the corporate level (Table 21) General Cinema revenues were 
again such that the company began a new acquisition search. As part 
of this mode, new members were appointed to the Board of Directors. 
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GENERAL CINEMA THEATERS, INC. OPERATING OFFICERS 1975-1983 
Years 
Officers 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
M. Wintman Pres. I I I I I 
H. Hurwitz Ex.VP 
D. Reardon Sr.VP I I 
W. Zel len Treas . Sr.VP-Fin. I I I 
F. Charles VP-Film 
M. Englander VP-Rea 1 I I I I I 
Estate 
S. Evans VP-Pub./ I I I I I 
Prom. 
N. Levidor VP-Adv. I I I I 
J. Saunders VP-Pur .I I I I I I 
Const. 
H. Spiess VP-Oper. I I I I I 
S. l~erthman VP-Conces . I I I I I 
D. Leavitt Contr l . I I I I I 
L. Lapidus VP-Film I I I I 
A. Frankel VP-Treas . I I I 
P. Isaacs VP-Film 
T. Sherak VP-Film I 
P. Del Rossi Ex. VP 
































GENERAL CINEMA COMPANY OFFICERS 1960-1983 
Years 
Company Officers 1950 1951 1962 1963 1954 1965 1966 1967 1953 1969 1910 1971 1912 1913 r974 1975*1976 1977 1973 1979 1930 1931 1932 1933 
P. Smith Pres . (Dec. ) 
R. Smith VP Pres. I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
E. Kurland Treas. I I Sec . I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
S. Stoneman Sec. I I 
H. Singer Asst. Sec. I I I I I I I I I I I I I I (Dec.) 
R. Kurland Asst . 1 I I I I 
Sec. 
E. Lane Ctrl Treas I I I I I I I I I Fin . VP I (Ret.) 
M. Wintrnan I Ex-VP I I I I I I I I I I I Pres. I I I I I I I 
Th.Div. 
S. Seletsky VP-Film I I I I I I (Dec.) 
H. Hurwitz Asst.VP I I I I I I Sr . VP I I I I 
Theat. 
W. Zel len Ctr l . I I I I I Ass t. Treas I I I VP I I 
Treas 
C. Reardon Asst.VP VP -Film I I 
Film 
J. Saunders Asst.VP, I I I 
Const/Pur 
H. Spies Asst.VP! I I I 
The at. 
S. Unobskey Asst.VP 
Real Est 
L. Lapidus VP-Film ,1 
F. Charles Ass t .VP/ I 
Film 
M. Rabinovitz Asst .Sec . I I I I I I ,I 
J. Ives VP I Ch.Fin. I I I I I I I Ex.VP 
Ofc. 
H. Paige Sr.VP- Pres. I 
llev. Bev . Di v. (Res . ) 
A. Tanger Sr.VP I I I I I I 
ConUTI. 




TABLE XX (Continued) 
Years 
Company Officers 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1""9T0975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
A. Trauber VP I I I I I I 
Contrl 
S. Frankenheim Sr.VP I I I I I 
Counsel 
M. Stevens VP I I I I 
S. Ackerman Asst. I I I I 
Contrl 
D. Wheeler Asst. I I I I 
Treas. 
T. McDermott VP 
Hum . Rel. 
J. Moodey VP I ./ I 
Treas. 
P. Del Rossi VP VP 
W. Savel VP 






Direc tor s 
1. P. Smi t h 
2. fL Smith 
3, E. Kurland 
4. S. Stoneman 
5. M. Wheeler 
6. C. Moore 
7. E. Lane 
8 . J . Darsky 
9. M. Wintman 
10. R. Shi r el iff 
11. D. Margoli s 
12. J. Ives 
13. w. Brown 
14. R. Little 
15. R. Chilrpie 
16. N. Darl i ng 
17. D. Ilagan 
18. A. Collier 
19. H. Hurwitz 
20. H. Paige 
21 . H. Uyterhoeven 
22 . H. Jarvis 
23 . R. Tarr 
TABLE XXI 
GENERAL C fNEMA CORPORATION BOARD OF DI RECTORS 1960-1983 
Year 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
,I 
,, I .,, Chair .,, ,I I ( .,, .,, I .,, .,, I .,, .,, .,, .,, I I .,, .,, I I 
of Board 
,I .,, l Corp. 
Genera l 
,I I .,, ( ,I I .,, .,, I I I .,, .,, I .,, .,, I I I Emeritus 
Couns 1~ 1 .,, ,, I Chair I .,, ( .,, ,1 Vice-ChJ I .,, .,, I I .,, I .,, .,, I I I I 
Ex.Com. Board 
,I ( I ( .,, .,, I l I .,, 
I I .,, / .,, I I l I I .,, I 
Treas . I .,, I I I .,, (Ret.) Fin . I 
Consult. .,, I I ,I .,, I .,, I .,, . I I I I 
Ex -VP I .,, I I .,, I I .,, .,, I I I .,, I .,, 
I I I I .,, 
I I I I I I 
I I ,I I ,I I ,I ,I I ,I I ,I ,I 
,I I ,I I I I I .,, ,I / I 
I I ,I 
I I ,I I 
I ,I ,I ,I I ,I ,I .,, 
I I ,I ,I ,I I ,I ,I 
I I ,I I ,I I ,I 
I I I I I ,I I 
,I 
I ,I ,I I 
,I I I 
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1983, with the retirement of the President of the Theater Division, a 
major organization restructuring occurred at the corporate and division 
levels. An Office of the Chair.man was created to bring together the 
financial, general management and legal expertise to direct the future 
growth (the next phase) of General Cinema (Annual Report 1983:7): 
A key to General Cinema's future success will be the quality 
of its management. Several senior level management changes 
occurred at General Cinema during 1983 designed to enable 
the Company to achieve its long- range goals. In September 
the Company established the Office of the Chairman which is 
responsible for developing and implementing General Cinema's 
strategic plans, including supervision .of the Company's 
existing operating divisions and further diversification. 
Within the Theater Division a whole new management team was in 
place including a new President, and Vice-Pres i dents for Marketing 
(new department), Construction, Operations, Fi lm and Concessions. 
The Theater Division was restructured to 1) position for the 
planned new growth (145 screens in 1984) and 2) shift emphasis from 
cost control and margin maintenance to an aggressive sales and mar-
keting program. In marketing many independent functions have been 
combined (public relations, advertising, promotions, cooperative 
advertising, and publicity), and a national theater marketing 
strategy is being developed. Marketing and operational decentrali-
zation through the regional offices is underway. New central functions 
(personnel and training) are being established. 
Major Periods in the History of General Cinema 
All strategies were scanned together to isolate major historical 
periods. Important turning points have been inferred. Five major 
periods were identified (Table 22). 
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This first period was one of definition (formation) of Midwest 
Drive-In as a public corporation. The death of Philip Smith, and the 
assumption of leadership by his son, Richard Smith, required that 
this period be one of leadership formation. A refinement of the 
definition of the Company business also occurred during this period. 
The target market/business gradually became defined as leisure-time 
family entertainment in suburban growth areas. 
The basic values of the company were establi~hed; the principal 
leaders learned the ways of theater mall financing, development and 
operation. The business emphasis shifted from growth of drive-ins to 
theater malls. Problems were addressed and resolved: establishing 
a balanced year around cash flow, protection of earnings against loss 
(by geographic diversity), and gaining a strong competitive position 
(by early entry). 
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The Company's financial and growth goals were shaped during this 
period. They predominated in future periods as deliberate strategies . 
Conceptually, this period may be· viewed as one of formation of basic 
values, articulation of the environment, and specification of impor-
tant theater strategies. These strategies serve as an operational 
base for other periods. The growth strategy emphasized geographical 
expansion (deliberate) and the design strategy introduced "twin" 
theaters at a location (emergent). 
Strategies were organized around Richard Smith's perceptions of 
the changing environment (suburban growth, changing demographics and 
rising di sposable personal income). The period was one of slow growth, 
defining and learning, and consolidation of competitive position . 
Growth and financial goa l s were established. The strategies were 
incremental, expansionistic, and explicit. They were concerned with 
problem-solving, and positioning for strength and future competition. 
1968-1975 
This period was one of dramatic global change (diversification). 
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The Company shifted from a strategy of growth by operational expansion 
to one of growth by diversification by acquisition. This was also a 
period of rapid expansion of operations---both theaters and bottling. 
Acquisition strategies were now used for geographic dispersion and 
operation expansion for theaters also. In 1973 the Company became the 
largest movie theater operator and the second largest independent soft 
drink bottler in the United States. In the Annual Reports of this 
period, Richard Smith discusses the changes occurring in the Company 
environment and their importance/eff ect on the General Cinema 
business(es). Richard Smith saw the environment as full of oppor-
tunity. Leisure time and disposable income will continue to grow. 
There was greater demand for variety with the expansion of the "under 
30 11 market. The environment led to many "emergent" operations strat-
egies. The number of mall theaters more than tripled, while the number 
of drive-ins operated by General Cinema declined rapidly. Design 
strategies shifted to the construction of three and four-plexes to 
provide better for segmented audience tastes. Growth shifted from a 
geographic dispersion to a location expansion strategy. Theater 
operating margins began fluctuating leading to more emphasis on 
problem solving modes in operations and on expanding concession 
l 06 
profits. Leadership during this period was strongly entrepre-
neurial. 
Much of the reason for the rapid growth dur ing this period (and 
a major force in the emergence of a diversificat ion strategy) was the 
excess cash flow being generated by theaters in the mid-1960's. The 
theaters' fixed assets required minimal replacement, leaving the cash 
flow from depreci ation available to finance most of the future theater 
growth. This l eft the income from theaters available for reinvestment 
in new business(es ). As Richard Smith noted (Uyterhoeven, 1976:18): 
After the bowling venture I didn't think serious ly about 
diversificat i on until our cash-flow picture started to 
change in 1966 and it became clear that we were going 
to have money to invest. 
Strategy during this period, from a conceptual viewpoint, could 
be described as gl obal and evolving. Diversification emerged as 
necessary with the excess cash flow. Bottling appears as a natural 
extension of the Company's vending and concession opeations at drive-
ins and theaters. (General Cinema nearly bought a vending machine 
company in 1966 but the purchase would have had a substantial P/E 
dilution effect.) The real estate strategy of leasing for theaters 
was extended to beverage plants, thereby limiting the Company's need 
for funds. 
At the beginning of this period, strategy was less intended, 
But once taken, acquisition and diversification became the "big step" 
which quickly became the new major deliberate strategy for this period. 
In speaking about this period, the Financial Vice-President, Mr . 
Lane, noted (Uyterhoeven, 1976: 20): 
We have a tremendous pride in t he accomplishments of 
General Cinema. Our execut i ve group has been able to make 
quick decisions that have been essential in nailing down 
theater sites and making acquisitions. Our batting average 
has been pretty good so far. Dick Smith has a great deal 
of self-confidence and optimism t hat has given us the 
spirit to take controversial locations and make them work. 
The beverage business looked like it might have been 
the solution to our diversification problems. We had 
found another noncyclical growth business that could be 
leveraged to the benefit of our shareholders. 
The experience of this period was a validation of the objectives 
(intended) set fort h in the previous period. This view is reflect ed 
in the remarks of Richard Smith from the Annual Reports of this 
period. 
1975-1978 
This period was a time of consolidation (organization and debt 
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restructuring) and of further divisionalization. Much of the strategy 
formation during this period was implicit---and reactive---a product 
of changes that had/were occurring within the external and internal 
environments of the Company. 
In 1975 theater and beverage operating incomes were approximate ly 
equal. Theater income had been used (as a cash cow) to fund the devel-
opment of beverages (the star). The drive-in and theater mall oper ations 
to a lesser extent were now entering a more mature development stage. 
Theater costs were increasing and operating margins continued to 
fluctuate. Theater consolidation activities included phasing out 
drive-ins and other unprofitable theaters and more broadly defining 
the business as "leisure-oriented consumers." 
At the corporate level a series of actions were taken. In 1975 
the Company Offices were restructured into Corporate Officers and 
Operating Division Officers, thereby formalizing the Division structure 
l 08 
within the Company. During 1976-1977 the Board of Directors expanded 
its membership to include chief executives of large companies (located 
in the Boston area), bankers, and a university (business) professor. 
The Company also restructured its longterm debt. Balance sheets 
were improved in 1976. Internally generated cash flow was used to 
further reduce bank debt. 
The deliberate strateg ies which influenced the actions of this 
period are described by Mr. Smith in the Annual Report (1977:3): 
Our principal objective is in consonance with the 
class ical economic role of an 'enterprise'--to create 
and maximize value for its equity sharehol ders. In the 
1976 list of Fortune 500 industrials General Cinema's 
ten -year total return to stockholders was 22.1 %. General 
Cinema ranked fourteenth in this category among the 500 
largest industrial companies in the United States; thus 
indicating that we have more than met our principal 
objective. 
We have characterized and sought to manage General 
Cinema as a 'growth company.' Since the 1960's, a 
growth company has often been defined as one which is 
able to sustain an above average annual compound rate 
of growth in earnings per share. Over the last ten 
years our earnings per share have grown at a 14.4% 
annual compound rate, and over the last five years at 
an 18.2% rate. Coincidentally, we have attempted to 
maximize the return on shareholders' equity. During 
the same ten year period, we have generated a 20.2% 
average return on our shareholders' equity, and over the 
last five years this return has averaged 17.5%. 
Mr. Smith then goes on to state that the Company goal is to 
"continue to maintain a 15% average annual rate of earnings growth 
into the mid-1980's." 
From a conceptual perspective, the Company had never experienced 
a period of consolidation. Even though the orientation was problem-
solving, the mode was essentially reactive. The changes in the environ-
ment, internal growth and external changes occurring in the f inancial 
markets forced the Company to cope with these constraints. Strategy 
is piecemeal for divisionalization restructuring and incremental for 
consolidation of operations . Overall at the corporate and the oper-
ations level, strategy is emergent. General Cinema now elects to 
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be a first run exhibitor and to continue to grow in carefully selected 
(regional mall) markets. 
More than anything, this period can be perceived as one of pre-
paration. General Cinema leadership is preparing itself for the 
expansion and fu t ure diversification they believe is coming. 
The concept of planning is now introduced---but it is not a paper 
planning process. Mr. Smith sees the role of planning as long-range, 
serving to identify and acquire another major operating division. 
This, however, does reflect a change in Mr. Smith's orientati on to 
the potential role of planning. 
Mr. Smith had previously described his search process as (Uyter-
hoeven, 1976:20): 
I am doing most of the worrying about diversification myself. 
The process is time-consuming; it took 15 months to work out 
the first soft-drink acquisition. We don't have a planning 
or corporate development office at General Ci nema. · It 
doesn't make much sense whin we're looki ng for only one 
opportunity. Nor have I asked consultant s to prepare a 
study for us. However, I have put the word out through 
our Board and the bank that we want something, and we're 
getting a number of inquiries. 
In one sense, this was a period in which strategy formation was 
separated from the organization structure (the need to formal i ze and 
expand/manage central and regional operations). Growth and diversi-
fication (deliberate) strategy formation now occurred at the 
executive (corporate) level . Strategies necessary to maintain perform-
ance expectations and to adapt to the changing (theater mall) environment 
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"emerged" at the operations level through geographic, design, film 
and real estate strategies. 
1978-1982 
The 1978-1982 period was one of "looking for the third leg of 
the stool." It was a time of position strengthening. Essentially 
the period emphasized continuity by strengthening Company leadership 
in existing businesses and by expanding the scope of operations into 
other consumer product areas. 
Two major strategies dominate this period---one deliberate, con-
tinued steady expansion, and one emergent, the search for (new growth) 
opportunity. 
Most of this period is devoted to a strategy of search. The tone 
of the period is reflected in these remarks by Richard Smith (Uyter-
hoeven, 1976:19): 
We are in the position again of having funds available for 
investment. I am interested in developing just one additional 
opportunity. When the company was smaller, it was O. K. to 
think about starting in a field from scratch, but t hat isn't 
as appropriate now as the purchase of an existing business. 
It should be big enough to.have an immediate impact on 
earnings. It should have a capable management, good growth 
prospects, and a continuing need for investment. At the 
same time, General Cinema must be able to bring its compet-
ence to bear on the new business. I don't want to be 
dependent on the specialized skills of a few individuals. 
For that reason highly technical or stylized or even manu-
facturing businesses are not really of interest. 
A major strategy shift occurs here, from emphasis on entrepre-
neurial innovation and problem solving to planning and search for 
opportunity. The primary corporate objective was to "maintain 
General Cinema as a true growth company." 
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Both beverage and mall theaters are now cash cows wi t h the profits 
available for investment in a program of diversification. The Company 
again felt the pressure for a new (growth) operating division. In 
conceptual terms, the formulas for diversification and expansion had 
been worked out. Now they were persured deliberately. Toward the 
end of this period General Cinema invested in Heublein which then 
merged with R. J. Reynolds. 
1983-
This period is in its formative stage. But several events, 
inc luding a new management team/restructuring of the theater divi-
sion and the establishment of the Office of t he Chairman serve to 
give this period a beginning global thrust. These events, and the 
new rapid expansion of theaters underway, are directly attributable 
to actions taken by Mr. Smith. 
For theaters, several environmental forces have significant 
implications for future strategies---those which are currently deli-
berate and those which are just emerging. 
General Cinema has undertaken a major new expansion program in an 
environment where there has been attendance erosion, and strong multi-
plex expansion by other competitors. Perhaps the changes evolving in 
competitor relationships, with continued multiplexing and location 
clustering at selected locations offers the greatest threat to General 
Cinema's deliberate strategies. Emergent strategies necessary to 
adapt to this new competitive/potential screen oversupply environment 
will be of major importance. · 
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It is anticipated that this will be a period of global change, 
with new efforts at diversification, followed by continuity and 
adaptation to a changed compet i tive, demographic and economic 
environment. 
The Company is shifting agai n toward an entrepreneurial, pro-
active strategy mode. In this mode they have traditionally reacted 
early to environmental change by having a clear vision of the 
business (and of its goals) and by combining interactively intended 
and emergent strategy formation to change and adapt . 
Conceptually, this period began with global change of the internal 
organization structure and environment. This period will be charact-
erized by the dichotomy of the ol d versus the new . More regionalization 
will be emphasized. Overall, strategies will move from less deliberate 
(emergent) to more deliberate, and to more entrepreneurial, but less 
guided by the visions of one man. However, deliberate theater expan-
sion strategies will continue to be influenced by Richard Smith's 
knowledge and vision of the theater exhibition business. 
Strategy Formation - Some Conclusions 
Overall, the study supported the observations of Mintzberg and 
Waters concerning strategy formation in a rapidly growing entrepre-
neurial firm. In comparing General Cinema strategy and period history 
with Steinberg Inc., many si milarities, and some differences , were 
noted. 
Among the important similarities with Steinberg were: 
l . General Cinema did evolve from a si mple structure in the 
1960's t o a more el aborate and st andardi zed structure, 
and finally to a more formalized and divisionalized 
structure in the late 1970's. This increasingly complex 
structuring of the organization seems to be directly 
associated with company size and diversification. 
2. General Cinema's beginn ing orientation was entrepreneurial 
with the leadership and vision provided by Richard Smith. 
As the Company grew and became structurally more complex, 
the Company experienced a gradual shift towards a plann ing 
orientation. 
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3. Shifts in major (deliberate) strategy occurred infre-
quently. The most major shift occurred with diversificati on 
(by acquisition) being introduced as a strategy for fut ure 
growth. 
4. Many of the early periods and their internal characteristics 
were quite similar for the two companies. The pattern of 
transition between major periods was also sequentially 
analagous when examined across a series of periods. 
Strategy change for General Cinema was frequently unintended. Once 
the broad corporate goals (basic company values/ideology) were arti-
culated in the first period, these served to guide future strategy at 
the company level. Emergent strategy predominated at the operational 
level. These strategies arose in response to changes in the environ-
ment. For most of its history General Cinema has been an early 
identifier of changing trends and through the use of emergent strategies, 
a quick adapter, though this pattern is less strong for some strategy 
areas in later periods. 
For General Cinema, deliberate strategies have been goal driven 
(and shaped by entrepreneurial leadership). They have changed infre-
quently. On the other hand unintended strategies have been shaped most 
by environment (and in later periods by organization structure) and have 
changed more frequently. It appears that emergent strategies are more 
dynamic and adaptive to the environment. This is more so where the 
structure is simple or where operations are more regionalized and 
decentralized. 
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A major difference observed between Steinberg and General Cinema 
was the pattern of growth. The pattern of unsteady growth (sprints 
and pauses) of Steinberg's observed by Mintzberg and Waters (1982) was 
less apparent wi th General Cinema . Rather, there appears to be an 
overall stable growth pattern. In the early years growth started up 
slowly, increased rapidly for a few years and then leveled into a 
stable, continuous expansion pattern . Theaters opening and overall 
total screen growth both given an impression of steady momentum to 
growth . 
A significant observation gained in this study is the role of the 
deliberate strategy in stabilizing organization growth. Deliberate 
goal driven strategies (growth and shareholder wealth) seem to provide 
more focus to strengthen overall strategy formation. Articulated 
goals have a very important function. In the General Cinema case, 
the goal of generating shareholder wealth seemed to dampen the erratic 
development of strategies. (In later periods, goal driven strategies 
also acted to constrain the strategist. During a period of needed 
transition goal driven strategies may also act to slow the changes by 
resisting new emergent strategies which require deliberate [goal] 
strategy modification . An example of this is maintenance of the 20% 
ROI requirement at certai n new theater locations as the environment 
became more competitive through plexing and clustering.) 
A review of strategy formation related to diversification provides 
a useful working model of the relationship between intended and unin-
tended strategies. The need to diversify during most of the Company's 
history has been problem-solution oriented. The bowling diversification 
was intended to provide the Company with balanced, year around cash flow. 
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As excess cash became a problem after 1966, the Company again began 
to look to diversification---to find a new operating division. After 
the acquisition and growth of beverage, the excess funds generated 
by both beverage and theaters again created pressure on the Company 
to find a new operating division . This latest diversification was 
seen as "finding the third leg of the stool." Overall, the strategy 
process has been incremental, each time less intended than as necessary 
to solve a problem. 
Gradually, thi s unintended strategy has evolved into a deliberate 
and dominant pattern in the strategy stream. As such, this example 
supports the conceptualization that strategy formation is a process, 
and that strategy becomes the consistency of behavior over time. 
Us i ng this same example, the interplay of environment, organi-
z'ational leadership and structure may be examined for their effects 
over time on strategic change. 
Diversification pressure arose each time there was excess cash 
flow being generated, a problem in need of a solution. In the early 
periods strategy was shaped almost entirely by entrepreneurial leader-
ship. Strategy was formed by the entrepreneur (in this case Richard 
Smith) based on his vision of the environment. Diversification was 
emergent (adaptive) and unintended (problem oriented). 
With the resultant increased structural complexity (divisional-
ization) that occurred as a product of the initial diversification, 
when the second excess cash problem (the pressure to diversify) arose, 
the pattern of behaviors and strategy formation process was already 
changing. The entrepreneur did not just interact with his environment 
to develop a strategy . Rather he now appears more "constrained" by 
organization structure. The concept of planning is introduced into 
the process of diversification. The orientation shifts from problem 
solving to searchi ng for new opportunity. 
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It is very clear that Richard Smith understood the transition 
which was occurring as the Company grew. In the mid-1970's he stated 
that General Cinema must develop the required effective management for 
11 a company clearly moving on from its entrepreneurial stage" 
(Uyterhoeven, 1976:21). 
Most of the broad goal statements are introduced during the first 
period of the Company's history. When these are examined in light of 
what the Company said it would do, they in fact did what they said. 
Eventually the goal statements of the 1960's became "consolidated" 
with the diversification-growth experiences to form (become arti-
culated) as one major deliberate strategy (1977): to manage General 
Cinema as a true growth company. Ensuing periods have emphasized 
strategies which refine and support the major Company goals. A 
parallel shift in emphasis is found in the theater strategy statements. 
Early period strategies focus on responding to changing environmental 
trends, and developing early competitive growth strategies. Later 
period strategies are less focused on changing environment trends but 
rather on maintaining profitability and position (leader) maintenance. 
In effect, later theater strategy formation has been more closely 
associated with deliberate strategy and less formed out of emergent 
strategy. 
These General Cinema findings support several general Mintzberg 
and Waters findings. First, entrepreneurial strategies do tend to 
evolve toward planned modes of strategy formation as the organization 
grows and becomes more structurally complex, and/or as the leadership 
shifts orientation from vision and problem solving to search for 
opportunities. 
Second, the interplay between intended and emergent strat egy , 
relative to realized strategy appears to be at the heart of t he 
strategy formation process. As the Company grows and diversi f ies, 
emergent strategy becomes more constrained and more derived. It 
would appear that the capability of the organization to conti nue to 
form emergent strategies as it shifts toward a planning mode plays 
a primary role in its future viability. Greater decentralization 
and the use of umbrella strategies appear to be potential mechanisms 
which support emergent strategy formation in more complex structures. 
117 
Third, there do appear to be distinct regularities to the pattern 
of strategy change, wh ich can be isolated into periods . The shifts 
from one period to the next, and the associated changes in strategy, 
are usually in response to changes in the environment. In the early 
periods of the organization's history, deliberate strategies appear to 
respond more quickly/adapt/assimilate emergent strategies. In later 
stages, the ability to change a deliberate strategy may require a non-
incremental (Mint zberg, 1978) or quantum (Miller and Friezen, 1982) 
approach. This appears to have occurred for General Cinema in the 
period beg inning in 1983. 
Last, and most important, is the role of the entrepreneur in 
strategy formation. Richard Smith represents a classical example 
of entrepreneurial leadership. As chief executive officer, all major 
power resides in his offi ce. This power has been exercised in an 
entrepreneurial way during most periods in General Cinema's history. 
Formal planning has been far less important in shaping Company 
direction than his vision of the business---his intimate detailed 
personal knowledge of the (theater exhibition) business. His ability 
to examine trends occurring in the environment, and under stand how 
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they will impact the industry, have been the predominant force in 
creating new strategic thrusts (and structure) within General Cinema. 
Mr. Smith also seems to have an appreciation of the need to restructure 
the organization to maintain its environmental adaptability as it 
grows. At the same time all restructurings have concentrated respon-
sibility for long term growth goals and diversifi cation strategy 
with Mr. Smith and within the Office of the Chairman. This finding 
is consistent with other research discussed previ ously which shows 
th at strategy formation remains centralized at the top even as the 
company grows and becomes structurally more complex . 
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